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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
INCREASING THE ELICITATION OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION FROM YOUNG
SUSPECTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TEMPORAL
DISCOUNTING
by
Andrea Arndorfer
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Lindsay C. Malloy, Major Professor
The criminal justice system relies heavily on eliciting truthful information from suspects
to solve crimes. A paramount problem with this approach involves the questioning of
young suspects. Numerous studies support the conclusion that youth is a risk factor for
providing false information during police questioning. The present study examined the
influence of temporal discounting (the tendency for individual’s behavior to be
influenced more strongly by proximal than distal factors; Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein,
2007; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001) and other developmental factors (i.e., impulse control,
future orientation, and sensation seeking) thought to underlie youths’ increased
interrogative vulnerability. In line with previous research examining developmental
differences in confession decisions, it was predicted that youth would be more likely than
adults to provide false admissions to escape the immediate consequences of the situation.
Furthermore, it was predicted that youth demonstrating lower impulse control, deficits in
future orientation, and increased sensation seeking would be most likely to engage in this
tendency. Using a randomized experimental design 205 adult and youth participants
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were questioned about their engagement in 20 criminal and unethical behaviors.
Participants were told responding “yes” or “no” to these questions would have either
immediate consequences (i.e., answering a series of repetitive questions) or future
consequences (i.e., meeting with a police officer in a few weeks). Analyses revealed
evidence of temporal discounting: Participants provided more admissions when denials,
rather than admissions, were punished with immediate consequences. Contrary to
hypotheses, age, impulse control, future orientation and sensation seeking did not
moderate this relationship. Similarly, hypotheses regarding the relationship between age
group, impulse control, and future orientation were unsupported. Compared to adults,
adolescents did not exhibit less impulse control or future orientation. The current study
was the first to experimentally examine factors thought to underlie youths’ increased
proclivity to provide false information in interrogation. Justice system involved youth
may differ from youth in the current study in key ways that help explain the lack of
support for study hypotheses. Because of these differences, it is imperative that future
research focuses on youth who are most at risk of encountering the justice system as
suspects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system relies heavily on eliciting truthful information from
suspects, often in the form of confession, as an expedient method for solving crimes.
One study examining over 1,000 criminal cases found that police investigators obtained
confessions from suspects in approximately 42% of interrogations (Moston, Stephenson,
& Williamson, 1992). However, a paramount problem in police interactions, especially
with young suspects, is the elicitation of false information. Using various methodologies
(e.g., laboratory incidents of wrongdoing, hypothetical vignettes, field studies, and
analysis of DNA exoneration cases), researchers have found that youth are more
susceptible to providing false information than adults, often in the form of false
confession (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Gross & Shaffer, 2012; Redlich & Goodman, 2003).
The present study sought to understand why youth are more susceptible to providing false
information during questioning about wrongdoing by examining, experimentally,
characteristics of youth (e.g., poor impulse control, lack of future orientation, increased
sensation seeking) possibly underlying their interrogative vulnerability.
Adolescence is an important developmental period psychologically and
criminologically; it is a time when many individuals have their first encounters with law
enforcement, especially as suspects to crimes (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2011, 2012). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Uniform Crime Report (2013), over 700,000 juveniles were arrested between 2012 and
2013. However, this number only accounts for official arrests; many juvenile offenses go
unreported and are handled informally because at times, such offenses are considered to
be part of the normative process of adolescent maturation (Office of Juvenile Justice and
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Delinquency Prevention Statistical Briefing Book, n.d.). Youths’ involvement with
police could be attributed, in part, to increases in sensation seeking, low impulse control,
and decreased consideration of the future or long-term consequences of one’s behavior
during this developmental time period (Steinberg, 2008, 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009).
Many juveniles are also informally questioned by law enforcement, thereby increasing
the opportunities for juveniles to provide false information. Perhaps the most striking
finding in the interrogation literature is the overrepresentation of youth in proven false
confession cases (i.e., youth comprised one third of the sample in one study; Drizin &
Leo, 2004). Furthermore, recent research suggests that a significant number of
incarcerated 14- to 17-year-olds indicate having falsely confessed to police (17%) or
having made a false guilty plea (18%) at least once (Malloy, Shulman, & Cauffman,
2014). Consequently, determining strategies and tactics to elicit the maximum amount of
truthful information from young suspects is critical for exonerating the innocent and
apprehending the guilty.
For several decades, there has been increased concern surrounding how young
victims and witnesses are questioned; however, only recently has similar concern
emerged about how youth are interrogated as suspects (The International Association of
Chiefs of Police, 2012). Modern police interrogations are, by design, psychologically
manipulative, stressful, and intimidating (see Kassin et al., 2010; Lassiter & Meissner,
2010; Leo, 2008, for reviews). These modern tactics may be particularly likely to elicit
false information and confessions from juveniles who, in comparison to adults, may: (1)
have diminished capacity to regulate and suppress the expression of self-incriminating
statements, (2) overvalue the immediate benefits of escaping the aversive interrogation
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situation, and (3) discount the potential for the aversive situation to continue in the future.
Consequently, this study was driven by three main objectives. Specifically, the current
study used a standardized experimental paradigm to examine the influence of (1) age
(youth vs. young adults vs. older adults), (2) temporal discounting (the consideration of
immediate vs. future rewards), and (3) factors characteristic of youth development (i.e.,
impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking) on individuals’ decisions to
provide true and false admissions during questioning. Each objective and the importance
of its inclusion will be discussed in the sections that follow.
Historical Overview of Interrogation Practices
Historically, it was not uncommon for police to resort to physical violence
(traditionally called “the third degree”; e.g., burning suspects with cigarettes; giving
suspects electric shocks; twisting suspects’ testicles; beating suspects with fists, guns,
rubber hoses, etc.; dragging or lifting female suspects by their hair) and brutality to
extract confessions from suspects (Leo, 2008). However, in 1931 a government
commission issued a report (Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement) documenting
these abuses. The report received much negative press and attention leading police
investigators to abandon overt forms of physical abuse for more covert abuse and
psychological coercion (e.g., pushing suspects’ head into the toilet; forcing suspects to
stand upright for hours; depriving suspects of sleep; physically isolating suspects from
other individuals and the outside world; withholding food, water, and bathroom
privileges). Several legal decisions in the early 1960s (see Culombe v. Connecticut,
1961; Davis v. North Carolina, 1966; Reck v. Pate, 1961; Townsend v. Swain, 1963)
moved investigators away from physical brutality towards more purely psychologically
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manipulative techniques. Consequently, at present, confessions are generally ruled to be
inadmissible if they have been acquired as a result of physical force, sleep and/or food
deprivation, prolonged periods of isolation, explicit threats of violence, clear promises of
leniency, and explicit promises of immunity from prosecution.
Modern day police investigators are allowed to employ a wide berth of tactics in
the interrogation room. Many police officers and investigators have been trained in the
Reid Technique – the most popular interrogation technique in the United States (Inbau,
Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013; Kassin, 2008). The two stage interrogation technique is
designed to instill a sense of loss of control in suspects and to increase suspects’ feelings
of vulnerability and anxiety. In the first stage, the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI),
investigators question suspects and observe both nonverbal and verbal behavior to
determine whether they believe the suspect is being deceptive (Inbau et al., 2013). Police
investigators do not move on to the second phase – the actual interrogation – if the
suspect is classified as an innocent truth teller. However, if the suspect is classified as
deceptive (and presumably guilty) investigators are then to seamlessly transition into a
three-pronged (nine-step) interrogation approach.
The interrogation consists of three stages 1) custody and isolation, 2)
confrontation, and 3) minimization of the crime and severity of the associated
consequences (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). In the first step, investigators are advised
that, once in custody, the suspect be isolated (from family, friends, co-workers, or any
source of social or emotional support) and placed in a small, private, mostly empty room.
Interrogators are instructed to begin the interrogation by confronting the suspect with a
direct, accusatory statement of guilt (“We know you did this.”) and are encouraged to
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support the accusations with the presentation of real or fabricated evidence (“We have an
eyewitness who reported seeing you at the scene of the crime.”). Furthermore, the
investigator is to reject and silence all pleas of innocence (e.g., by interrupting and
cutting the suspect off or by putting up their hand and turning away from the suspect as
an indication to the suspect that s/he should stop speaking). At this time, investigators
may also employ maximization techniques (Kassin & McNall, 1991). That is,
accusations of guilt may be accompanied by exaggeration of the severity of the offense
and exacerbation of the likelihood of the suspect receiving a harsh sentence if s/he does
not confess and is found guilty at trial (e.g., life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, the death penalty).
The Reid technique also encourages investigators to employ minimization
techniques. Minimization techniques involve offering sympathy, face saving excuses,
and moral justifications to the suspect regarding their role in the commission of the crime
(e.g., “I’m sure you didn’t mean to do it.”; “If I were in your shoes, I may have done the
same thing.”; “I’m sure you didn’t realize what a big deal this would be.”). These
strategies are designed to gain the suspect’s trust and to have them view the police officer
as being “on their side” while simultaneously minimizing the seriousness of the crime
and potential consequences of confessing. Investigators end the interrogation by asking
the suspect for a confession and to provide a detailed account of what happened (Kassin
& Gudjonsson, 2004).
Researchers have identified several concerning aspects of the Reid technique (see
Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin, 1997). A primary criticism is that, whereas this
confrontational and accusatorial approach successfully elicits true confessions from
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guilty suspects, it also puts innocent suspects at risk for offering false confessions (Kassin
et al., 2010).
While the methods used to interrogate suspects have changed over the decades
(moving from physical torture to psychological coercion), the underlying structure of
interrogation, whereby admissions are rewarded in the short-term (i.e., escaping the
stressful interrogation), denials are continually punished (i.e., remaining in the stressful
interrogation) and future outcomes are minimized or dismissed from discussion, has
remained unchanged. It is the mechanisms underlying the interrogation process and
practices that may be putting youth at disproportionate risk, for providing false
confession. One such potential mechanism is temporal discounting.
Interrogations and Temporal Discounting
Psychology and law researchers have long speculated that suspects’ tendency to
prioritize short-term over long-term consequences and outcomes could increase suspects’
risk for confession and subsequent conviction. In fact, many interrogation tactics are
associated with proximal consequences that encourage suspects to confess. For example,
the primary method utilized for police interrogation (i.e., the Reid Technique; Inbau et
al., 2013) instructs that suspects should be isolated in a small room and seated in
uncomfortable, straight-backed chairs. Furthermore, suspects are to be subjected to
accusatorial and confrontational questioning. This is all by design. Suspects may
confess because they believe that doing so will conclude the interrogation thus allowing
them to escape this aversive and uncomfortable situation. Subsequently, distal
consequences associated with confessing (e.g., possible conviction, incarceration, or even
execution) encourage suspects to deny guilt and are often purposely minimized in most
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interrogations. However, should suspects fall prey to the natural tendency to value
immediate rather than future outcomes, they are simultaneously putting themselves at risk
for experiencing more severe distal consequences.
Drawing on this principle, Madon and colleagues (2012, 2013) developed an
experimental mock interrogation paradigm to investigate the influence of temporal
discounting on decision making in interrogation. The proposed research will utilize
Madon and colleagues’ novel paradigm as outlined below.
The tendency for individual’s behavior to be influenced more strongly by
proximal than distal factors is known as temporal discounting (Berns, Laibson, &
Loewenstein, 2007; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). The principle of temporal discounting
is a well-established theory across disciplines (e.g., decision making, learning) within the
psychological literature. However, for the purposes of the current study, its application in
cognitive psychology, particularly in the realm of decision making, is most applicable.
For example, decision theory indicates that people perceive immediate consequences to
be more important than distal consequences (Björkman, 1984). That is, humans’
cognition for distal events and consequences is limited in that their main focus is on the
‘here and now’ – if there is no benefit to be gained from waiting, individuals will prefer
immediate versus delayed gratification. For instance, if money is placed into a savings
account but there is no interest accrued on the money, then there is no benefit to leaving
the money in the account and waiting to spend it later. Thus, individuals may choose to
withdraw the money and spend it on immediate expenses. However, if interest will be
accrued on the money, thus resulting in an increase in the total balance over time,
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individuals will gain more money by leaving the money in the bank and saving it for
future expenses.
Similarly, research examining decision making strategies indicates that people
judge proximal outcomes as more certain than distal outcomes (Kalenscher & Pennartz,
2008; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986). Furthermore, according to prospect
theory, people tend to give greater weight to outcomes that are certain rather than
probabilistic, and, thus are more influenced by the proximal consequences associated
with their decisions than distal ones (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Perceiving proximal
consequences as more certain may explain why immediate consequences are judged to be
more important than distal consequences. Specifically, individuals may be more willing
to incur, in some circumstances, an immediate consequence because it is a ‘sure thing’
over the possibility of unknown or potentially changing distal consequences. For
example, suspects may be more willing to take a plea deal guaranteeing them 6 years in
prison instead of opting to go to trial, of which the resulting consequences are uncertain
(e.g., going to trial could result in the suspect being found not guilty and avoiding
punishment altogether or could result in the suspect being found guilty and sentenced to a
more severe sentence than that offered in the plea deal).
In sum, a body of extant research supports the phenomenon of temporal
discounting and its influence on human decision making and behavior. These theories
may be applicable in understanding suspect decision making in interrogation, particularly
the decision to falsely confess.
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False Confessions
Police interrogation is a guilt presumptive process in which the primary goal is to
obtain incriminating information from guilty suspects (Drizin & Leo, 2004). While
police interrogation usually elicits true confessions from guilty suspects, over the last
decade, there has been a growing concern that the methods used during interrogation to
obtain true confessions also put innocent suspects in danger of falsely confessing (OwenKostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006).
It is impossible to determine the precise prevalence of false confessions.
However, we can look to real-world exoneration cases and field research to inform our
understanding. Over 340 convictions have been overturned as a result of DNA evidence
(Innocence Project, n.d.). Of those DNA exoneration cases, at least 28% have cited the
proffering of self-incriminating statements, often in the form of false confession or false
guilty plea, from innocent suspects as a contributing factor leading to the wrongful
conviction (Innocence Project, n.d.). In light of such evidence, it is imperative to
construct methods that elicit true confessions from guilty suspects while reducing or
eliminating the likelihood of eliciting false confessions from innocent suspects.
One method for assessing the prevalence of false confession is to rely on selfreport data. Self-report studies use individuals’ own reports of whether they have or have
not falsely confessed to a past crime. Reports of alleged false confessions gathered from
over 35,000 Icelandic youth, revealed that between 7%-14% of students who had been
questioned by police as suspects claimed to have falsely confessed (Gudjonsson,
Sigurdsson, Asgeirsdottir, & Sigfusdottir, 2006; Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, & Sigfusdottir,
2009). Similar findings emerged for a sample of Danish youth with 7% claiming to have
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falsely confessed to police in the past (Steingrimsdottir, Hreinsdottir, Gudjonsson,
Sigurdsson, & Nielsen, 2007).
Researchers have also investigated reports of self-reported false confessions
amongst incarcerated adult and adolescent offenders. Twelve percent of adult offenders
in one Icelandic prison claimed to have falsely confessed to police with female offenders
claiming higher rates of false confession than males (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994).
Recently, research has begun to examine the prevalence of false confessions among
incarcerated adolescent offenders. Two recent studies revealed that between 6%
(Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005) and 17% (Malloy et al., 2014) of serious adolescent
offenders had reported past false confessions to police. While self-report studies are
accompanied by certain limitations (e.g., ground truth is unknown, claims of both true
and false confessions often cannot be verified), this research provides some insight into
the prevalence of real-world false confessions.
As highlighted next, confession evidence, even if false, is accorded extraordinary
weight at trial. Even more alarming is the fact that true and false confessions are often
virtually indistinguishable (Kassin, Appleby, & Perillo, 2010; Kassin, Meissner, &
Norwick, 2005) meaning that jurors cannot simply siphon out false confessions
themselves. It is precisely for these reasons that it is paramount to acquire a better
understanding of confession evidence.
Impact of Confession Evidence
Confession evidence is amongst the most damning evidence presented at criminal
trial (Kassin et al., 2010; Drizin & Leo, 2004), having greater impact on juror decision
making than eyewitness and character testimony (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). Even the
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United States Supreme Court has deemed confessions to be one of the most persuasive
and condemning forms of evidence presented at criminal trials (Miranda v. Arizona,
1966). All the more striking is the fact that jurors fail to discount confession evidence
even when they have concluded that the confession was coerced or given involuntarily
(i.e., the confession was likely a false self-incriminating admission of guilt; Kassin &
Sukel, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980).
There are two primary reasons concerning why jurors are unable or unwilling to
discount confession evidence when making verdict decisions even after recognizing that
the confession was given as a result of coercion or duress. First, humans (including
experienced police officers and interrogators) are poor detectors of deception with only
chance levels of accuracy when judging the veracity of true and false admissions of guilt
(Bond & DePaul, 2006; Honts, Kassin, & Craig, 2014; Kassin et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008).
Second, humans have difficulty understanding why someone would confess to often quite
heinous criminal acts if they had not committed the act. In other words, individuals tend
to quickly and automatically make dispositional inferences for others’ behavior (e.g., he
confessed because he is guilty) but have difficulties considering and accounting for
situational factors influencing that same behavior (e.g., he confessed because the police
officer was threatening him with severe consequences). In social psychological terms,
individuals make the fundamental attribution error (i.e., the tendency for individuals to
overestimate the influence of dispositional factors and underestimate the influence of
situational factors on others behavior; also known as correspondence inference theory;
Jones & Harris, 1967) when judging claims of suspects having made a false confession.
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Confessions are not only powerful in their own right but also have the power to
corrupt perceptions and taint interpretations of other evidence. A handful of studies have
shown that knowledge that a suspect has confessed influences experts and laypeople
alike. In one study, participants were exposed to a mock crime and were later asked to
identify a suspect from a photo lineup array. Participant witnesses returned to the
laboratory one week later and were told that the person they had identified had either
denied guilt, confessed, or that another lineup member, one that they had not identified,
had confessed. Witnesses were then exposed to the photo lineup array again. A
significant portion of witnesses changed their original identification decision to select the
individual they were told had confessed and did so with high levels of confidence (Hasel
& Kassin, 2009). In two studies, researchers discovered that confession evidence could
taint participants’ perceptions of handwriting evidence (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014).
Participants who were told that a suspect had confessed were more likely to erroneously
conclude that two handwriting samples were authored by the same individual (all
handwriting samples used for comparison were authored by different individuals) even
when the samples were rated as dissimilar.
Unfortunately, even professional forensic evidence experts are not immune to the
influential power of confessions. In one study fingerprint experts were given a pair of
fingerprints that they had previously accurately ruled as a match or exclusion years
earlier. Unknowingly, experts were presented with these same prints, and, when told that
the suspect had confessed, this misinformation produced a change in 17% of experts’
original previously correct judgments (Dror & Charlton, 2006). Because confession
evidence is heavily weighted and because false confessions are associated with negative
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consequences for the alleged suspect, numerous research studies have highlighted the
conditions – situational and dispositional – putting suspects at increased risk of
confessing and incurring the negative consequences associated with doing so.
Risk Factors Associated with False Confessions
Previous literature on interrogations and confessions has largely focused on and
revealed the specific techniques that are likely to elicit confessions. For example,
research has revealed lengthy interrogations (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Madon, Yang,
Smalarz, Guyll, & Scherr, 2013), the presentation of false evidence (Kassin & Kiechel,
1996), physical isolation of the suspect (Drizin & Leo, 2004), the offering of a deal
(Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), the use of minimization tactics (e.g.,
minimizing the severity of the crime, using face saving techniques; Russano et al., 2005),
among others, to increase the likelihood of eliciting a false confession (Kassin et al.,
2010). While it is important to be aware of the specific tactics that enhance the risk of
eliciting false confessions, a paucity of research has focused on the processes underlying
the elicitation of confessions, and, thus, little is known about the general mechanisms
underlying individuals’ confession decisions.
Dispositional risk factors. A dispositional risk factor is something inherent in the
individual being interrogated that makes him or her vulnerable to providing a false
confession (Perillo & Kassin, 2011). Three broad categories encompass dispositional
risk factors for false confession: age, cognitive and intellectual disabilities, and
personality and psychopathology (Kassin et al., 2010). The current study will primarily
focus on youth as a dispositional risk factor for false confession.
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Youth is a dispositional risk factor for false confession. Multiple methodologies
reveal a consistent finding: Youth is a dispositional risk factor for false confession
(Drizin & Leo, 2004; Redlich & Goodman, 2003; Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman,
& Geier, 2003; Malloy et al., 2014). For example, adolescents comprised 1/3 of the first
125 proven false confessions (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Furthermore, in the National
Registry of Exonerations (Gross & Shaffer, 2012), adolescents were over five times
(42%) more likely to have provided a false confession than adults (8%). While it is
impossible to determine the precise prevalence of false confessions, a recent study found
that 17% of 14- to 17-year-olds incarcerated in the U.S. reported having falsely confessed
to police (Malloy et al., 2014).
Multiple experimental laboratory interrogation studies involving minor incidents
of wrongdoing have been conducted with youth (Pimentel, Arndorfer, & Malloy, 2015;
Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Unfortunately, knowledge of age as a risk factor for
providing false confession does not reveal specifically why youth are more likely to
falsely confess. General developmental research has revealed a number of cognitive
(e.g., lack of future orientation, poor impulse control) and social (e.g., deference to
authority, increased peer orientation) characteristics of youth that may contribute to
youths’ increased propensity to falsely confess. However, to date, no known research has
been conducted to determine precisely what factor or factors influence youths’ increased
interrogative vulnerability.
Why are youth susceptible to providing false information? Developmental
psychologists have identified various factors differentiating youth from adults which
appear to put youth at increased risk in legal contexts, including when questioned by
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police as suspects (Steinberg, 2009, 2014). Only one known study has examined possible
factors underlying youths’ increased willingness to provide false information (Redlich &
Goodman, 2003). In this study, researchers examined the influence of suggestibility on
internalized false confessions (i.e., when suspects actually come to believe they
committed the crime in question; Kassin et al., 2010) of a laboratory wrongdoing (i.e.,
pressing a forbidden key n a computer task). Developmental characteristics like impulse
control, future orientation, and sensation seeking, which are investigated in the current
study, constitute more hallmark characteristics of adolescence. Furthermore, it is
possible that impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking, rather than
suggestibility, may better explain police induced false confessions (i.e., when suspects,
due to the pressures of interrogation, are induced to confess to a crime they did not
commit; Kassin et al., 2010). The focus of the current study was, in part, to identify
factors contributing to interrogative vulnerability in police interrogation. Thus, in
contrast to Redlich and Goodman, this study addressed police induced rather than
internalized confession decisions.
Future orientation. One potentially crucial factor for adolescents’ behavior and
decision making in interrogation contexts is their documented lack of future orientation.
Research indicates that adolescents weigh rewards differently than adults. Specifically,
behavioral and neuroscience research has revealed that, compared to adults, adolescents’
decisions are largely driven by gaining potential rewards as opposed to avoiding potential
risks (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Steinberg, 2009). Furthermore, compared to adults,
adolescents are prone to making more short-sighted, risky decisions without adequate
consideration for future consequences. For example, when adolescents’ perceptions of
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the short- and long-term pros and cons of engaging in various risky behaviors were
assessed (e.g., risks associated with unprotected sex; Steinberg & Scott, 2003),
adolescents tended to discount the future consequences (e.g., pregnancy) more than adults
and put more weight on the short-term consequences (e.g., pleasure) of their decisions.
Also, 10- to 15-year-olds demonstrate weaker future orientation than adolescents 16 and
older (Steinberg, 2009). Deficits in future orientation may, in part, be due to
underdevelopment of adolescents’ brains in regions associated with impulse control and
risk-taking (Steinberg, 2008; 2009). Research has shown that the ability to evaluate
future outcomes increases with age (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000) with adolescents
giving more weight to immediate, rather than delayed, outcomes (Steinberg, 2009).
The orientation to immediate outcomes may put young suspects at increased risk
in the interrogation room. Consistent with the temporal discounting principle, compared
to adults, adolescents may make self-incriminating statements simply because they
overvalue the proximal consequence of escaping an aversive, stressful situation more
than the distal consequences associated with continued denials (Drizin & Leo, 2004;
Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006). This likely does not occur because adolescents blatantly
disregard distal consequences, but because there are cognitive limitations on adolescents’
abilities to realistically consider events that might occur sometime in the future.
The nature of police interrogation, whereby admissions are rewarded in the shortterm (i.e., escaping the stressful interrogation) and denials are continually punished (i.e.,
remaining in the stressful interrogation), may disproportionately affect youth. As
discussed, Madon and colleagues (2012, 2013) developed an interrogation paradigm to
investigate the possibility that temporal discounting serves as a mechanism underlying
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the elicitation of false information in interrogation. Their findings supported this
supposition: When questioned about their engagement in a variety of criminal and
unethical behaviors, young adults altered their responses so as to avoid the proximal
consequence even though doing so put them at increased risk of incurring a more severe
distal consequence (Madon et al., 2012, 2013). Adolescents, because of developmental
deficits in future orientation, may be even more likely to avoid incurring undesirable
proximal consequences in favor of potentially more severe distal consequences.
Impulse control. Another influential factor may be impulse control. Adolescents’
diminished capacity to self-regulate and suppress their impulses may become exacerbated
during police questioning. Compared to adults, adolescents may be at an increased
propensity to make false self-incriminating statements due to the taxing nature of
interrogation and the continual weakening of their already limited impulse control. As
questioning continues, adolescents may be less able to persistently deny and override the
impulse to provide the response police desire from them (i.e., an admission of guilt).
Consequently, this process may result in the provision of false information. No known
research has specifically investigated impulse control as it relates to decision making in
interrogation.
Suspects who are both young and experience deficits in impulse control may be
especially vulnerable to providing false information in the interrogation room. Research
on one population of adolescents known to experience substantial reductions in impulse
control as a core deficit of their disorder (i.e., those with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder; ADHD) has revealed that these youth engage in higher rates of criminal
behavior (Sibley et al., 2012), substance use (Molina, Pelham, Gnagy, Thompson, &
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Marshal, 2007), school drop-out (Kent et al., 2011), and early sexual behavior (Flory,
Molina, Pelham, Gnagy, & Smith, 2006). Research has shown that individuals with
ADHD self-report having falsely confessed more than individuals without ADHD
(Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Newton, & Einarsson, 2008; Gudjonsson,
Sigurdsson, Sigfusdottir, & Young, 2012). The current study sought to advance our
understanding of factors characteristic of youth development with typically developing
youth. Should findings emerge with the typically developing adolescents used in this
study, one could only imagine that the effect would be even stronger with populations at
increased risk of becoming involved with and over-represented in the criminal justice
system (e.g., individuals with ADHD, intellectual disabilities, and mental illness). In
fact, even justice involved youth without a clinical diagnosis of ADHD, have been found
to exhibit poor impulse control (DeLisi & Vaughn, 2007).
How can deficits in impulse control and future orientation in adolescents be
explained? Numerous studies concerning adolescent development have involved
behavioral research; however, more recent work has been grounded in developmental
neuroscience in the hopes of revealing the neurological underpinnings of development
across the life stages (Steinberg, 2009). Although the present research will not focus on
adolescent brain development, neuroscientific and neurobiological evidence are discussed
to provide explanations for how deficits in impulse control, future orientation, and
sensation seeking may contribute to adolescents’ increased interrogative vulnerability
compared to adults.
Two main processes occur in adolescents’ brains which likely influence
adolescents’ decision-making and their subsequent likelihood of engaging in deviant
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behaviors. First, around the onset of puberty, a rapid increase in dopaminergic activity
occurs which is thought to increase reward seeking behavior (Steinberg, 2009). When
coupled with deficits in areas of the brain that are thought to serve self-regulatory and
impulse control functions, the rapid increase of dopaminergic activity leads to an
increased likelihood of risk taking, particularly during the period of middle adolescence
(Steinberg, 2009). Second, changes in brain structure and functioning occur during
adolescence which are not complete until early adulthood. Specifically, improved
connectivity across brain regions and maturation of the frontal lobes result in improved
thinking abilities (Steinberg, 2009). However, the maturation of self-regulatory and
impulse control functions and of the frontal lobes occur at different periods during
adolescence, and, thus, have different implications for cognitive development (Steinberg,
2009).
The interaction of these two brain development processes, often result in an
increase in sensation seeking in early to mid-adolescence. Concomitant self-regulatory
processes needed to combat this drive do not reach full development until late
adolescence or early adulthood (Steinberg, 2009). Because these processes develop
asynchronously, adolescence may be a particularly vulnerable time period. For example,
adolescents in interrogation may desire a lengthy, psychologically manipulative
interrogation to end due to increased activation of areas associated with reward
sensitivity. Because the brain regions associated with cognitive control are not fully
developed in adolescents, young suspects may be unable to override impulses seeking
reward fulfillment to end the interrogation by providing police with the desired response
– a confession. Hence, this combination of developmental factors may result in
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adolescence being a developmental period characterized by immature judgment and
decision-making, which may contribute, in part, to adolescents’ heightened interrogative
vulnerability.
The rate at which these two systems – those associated with increased sensation
seeking, risk taking, and cognitive regulatory mechanisms – develop, specifically the gap
that exists between the onset of one and the maturation and initiation of the other,
continues to influence individuals into adulthood (Steinberg et al., 2008). One study
examining self-reported and behavioral risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity in
individuals between the ages of 10 and 30, found increases in sensation seeking were
more prominent in individuals between the ages of 12 and 15. However, increases in the
ability to control those impulses was still undergoing development throughout
adolescence and into young adulthood (Steinberg et al., 2008). Consequently, in order to
detect differences in the influence of future orientation and impulse control on the
decision to confess, research employing experimental laboratory methods with youth and
both young and older adults is needed to provide insight into the influence of these
deficits on confession decisions. Unfortunately, current interrogation and confession
research has sampled from a rather limited age range.
Experimental Laboratory Paradigms for Investigating Confession Decisions
Because ground truth cannot be verified in self-report studies, nor can researchers
attempt to induce suspects of actual crimes to falsely confess for experimental purposes,
it is imperative to study the phenomenon of false confessions using experimental
laboratory analogue paradigms. Accordingly, multiple standardized mock interrogation
paradigms have been designed to investigate and assess the prevalence of and the factors
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contributing to false confessions of wrongdoing (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Russano et al.,
2005). Currently, there are three experimental paradigms for investigating false
confessions behaviorally in the laboratory.
The Alt key paradigm. Kassin and Kiechel (1996) provided the first
experimental evidence that individuals could be induced to confess to an act of
wrongdoing that they did not commit with their well-known “Alt key paradigm.” In this
study, adult participants were paired with a confederate for the purposes of completing a
typing experience task. All participants were explicitly warned prior to beginning the
typing task that they were not to hit the Alt key as doing so would result in the computer
crashing and all data being lost. Although none of the participants actually pressed the
Alt key, the computer was designed to automatically crash during the typing task. All
participants were then accused of failing to heed to the experimenter’s warning and
causing the computer to crash. Sixty-nine percent of participants eventually falsely
confessed to pressing the Alt key and causing the computer to crash. A later derivation
of this study, conducted with both adult and adolescent participants, observed a similar
overall confession rate (69%) across all participants (Redlich & Goodman, 2003).
Moreover, this study revealed that youth were in fact more vulnerable to providing false
admissions of guilt than adult participants. Specifically, approximately 75% of youth
(78% of 12- to 13-year-olds and 72% of 15- to 16-year-olds) falsely admitted guilt
compared to 59% of adults.
While the Alt key paradigm generally represents an important first step in the
experimental investigation of interrogation proceedings and outcomes, the paradigm has
several limitations and fails to adequately portray real-world interrogation and confession
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situations. First, all participants were factually innocent which prohibited the assessment
of diagnosticity through the comparison of true and false confessions, as all confessions
elicited were false confessions. Second, participants were unsure as to whether they were
innocent or guilty due to “accidentally” committing a highly plausible “crime.” This is
not reflective of real-world commission of crimes. Suspects in the real world are
typically accused of intentionally committing a crime and are aware of their culpability.
Another issue is that ground truth was unknown. That is, researchers had no way of
knowing whether some participants did, in fact, hit the Alt key and were providing true
confessions as researchers gathered no evidence of the keystrokes made during the typing
task. Finally, there were no consequences associated with providing a confession (but
see Redlich & Goodman, 2003). In other words, in direct contrast to real world
interrogations (in which serious consequences exist for those who admit to their
involvement in a crime), participants in this study had nothing to lose by providing a
confession. While Alt key paradigm provided a significant advance in the field and the
first model for evaluating false confessions in the laboratory, it was evident that a more
ecologically valid experimental paradigm was needed.
The “cheating” paradigm (Russano et al., 2005). Almost a decade later, a
novel paradigm for examining true and false confessions in the laboratory was developed.
This paradigm was designed to improve upon the limitations of the Alt key paradigm
(Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). First, this paradigm created a situation whereby participants
could be randomly assigned to guilt or innocence, which allowed for the assessment of
confession diagnosticity. Second, participants committed an intentional act of
wrongdoing and thus were aware of their guilt status (i.e., whether they were guilty or
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innocent of the act of wrongdoing). Finally, participants were led to believe that severe
consequences would result from providing a confession. Specifically, engaging in and
confessing to this act had the potential to result in expulsion from the university, which is
a very serious consequence for college students. This experimental mock interrogation
paradigm provided the first empirical evidence that true and false confessions to an
intentional act of wrongdoing could be elicited in the scientific laboratory.
In the cheating paradigm, participants arrived to the lab with a confederate under
the guise of completing a logic problem task. An experimenter instructed the participants
that some of the logic problems were designated as individual problems to be completed
alone and others were designated as group problems to be solved together. During the
problem solving phase of the experiment, confederates asked participants randomly
assigned to be guilty for help on one of the problems that was to be solved individually,
thereby violating a major experimental rule. Confederates never asked participants
randomly assigned to be innocent for help on any of the individual problems (therefore
the rules of the experiment were not violated). This manipulation induced some, but not
all, participants to intentionally commit a “crime.” All participants were later accused of
“cheating” on one of the logic problems that was designated to be solved individually.
Using a variety of interrogation tactics (some legal and others illegal for use in real-world
police interrogations), all participants (regardless of guilt or innocence) were accused of
having the same wrong answer on a problem that was to be solved individually, were told
the violation of study procedures could result in expulsion, and were asked to sign a
statement admitting to their involvement in the “cheating” incident. Nearly 20% of
innocent participants falsely confessed to breaking the experimental rules. The rate of
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both true and false confessions increased when legal (e.g., minimizing the seriousness of
the crime) and illegal (e.g., making explicit promises of leniency) interrogation tactics
were used in combination. Diagnosticity was highest when neither legal nor illegal
interrogation tactics were used and lowest when both were used in combination.
The cheating paradigm (Russano et al., 2005) has many advantages over its
predecessor. However, this paradigm is not particularly well-suited for examining the
possible influence of temporal discounting on confession decisions in interrogation,
which is the primary goal of the proposed study.
The repetitive question paradigm (Madon et al., 2012). Drawing on the
principle of temporal discounting (i.e., that proximal consequences influence behavior
more than distal consequences), researchers (Madon et al., 2012) developed a novel
experimental mock interrogation paradigm specifically to investigate the influence of
temporal discounting on decision making in interrogation. In this paradigm, participants
were questioned about their engagement in various criminal and unethical behaviors.
Depending on experimental condition, denials or admissions were punished with the
proximal (immediate) consequence of answering a set of repetitive questions. The distal
(future) consequence was an increased likelihood of meeting with a police officer to
discuss responses in depth at a later point in time. Consistent with the temporal
discounting principle, adult participants altered their responses so as to avoid the
proximal (immediate) consequence even though doing so put them at increased risk of
incurring a more severe distal (future) consequence. Similar to real world interrogation,
these findings simulate dogged persistence in the face of continued denials, and, when
that was the case, adults provided more admissions to criminal and unethical behaviors.
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The proposed research will utilize Madon and colleagues’ interrogation paradigm as it is
particularly well-suited to address the main research questions posed.
Expected Practical and Theoretical Contributions
Because youth is a known risk factor for false confession, recommendations (e.g.,
mandatory provision of a lawyer or appropriate adult, special training for law
enforcement personnel, electronic recording of interrogation, the use of developmentally
appropriate interrogation practices) have been made with the intent to safeguard youth
during interrogation (Kassin et al., 2010; Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006; Tepfer, Nirider, &
Tricarico, 2010). However, these reforms were recommended without an informed
empirical understanding of the factors underlying youths’ increased vulnerability in
interrogation. It is paramount that recommended reforms are grounded in empirical
research, in order to ensure that reforms are effective and appropriately designed to
address the tactics employed in interrogation that put suspects at increased risk of false
confession. Because known research has largely bypassed this important step, current
recommendations for reform may be misguided or even ineffective. To date, no study
has systematically examined why young suspects are more susceptible to providing false
information during questioning with police or other authority figures. The current study
was the first to do so.
Theoretically, the current study contributes to our basic understanding of youths’
susceptibility to provide false information when questioned as suspects. Results will
advance scientific knowledge of possible mechanisms underlying the elicitation of false
information in interrogation from youth. An understanding of the factors underlying
youths’ increased propensity to provide false information (e.g., poor impulse control) will
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allow the research community to design and implement informed and effectively targeted
interrogation reforms while contributing to a better understanding of individual
differences in confession decisions.
The Current Study
The overarching purpose of the current study was to examine, for the first time
experimentally, the factors – youths’ inability to appropriately consider future
consequences, diminished impulse control, and increased sensation seeking – possibly
underlying youths’ disclosure of false information in interrogation settings. Another key
goal was to examine the influence of temporal discounting on youths’ and adults’
interrogation decisions. Research suggests that, compared to adults, adolescents are
prone to making short-sighted, risky decisions without adequate consideration for future
consequences. Thus, suspects who are both young and experience deficits in impulse
control may be in “double jeopardy” for providing false information during interrogation.
In fact, extant research has produced evidence showing that impulsive youth –
specifically, those with low self-control – are more likely to engage in delinquency
(DeLisi & Vaughn, 2007).
I focused on examining potential factors that may underlie the increased
elicitation of false information during interrogation. The key objectives were to: (1)
compare admission rates of engagement in criminal and unethical behaviors among age
groups (adolescents vs. young adults vs. older adults); (2) determine the influence of
temporal discounting on admission decisions and whether the tendency to engage in this
behavior in interrogation is more pronounced among youth; and (3) investigate the
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influence of impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking on the willingness
of adults and adolescents to provide both true and false information.
The current study sought to assess developmental differences in the tendency to
provide true and false admissions among adolescents (ages 12 to 17), young adults (ages
18 to 24), and older adults (age 25 and above). The reasoning behind these three age
groups is twofold. First, extant interrogation research exploring developmental
differences in the tendency to provide true and false admissions has used a fairly
restrictive age range (e.g., Pimentel et al., 2015; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). I wanted to
expand the age range in an attempt to assess developmental differences across the age
range of the populations most likely to commit crime (Moffitt, 1993). Research has
shown that: 1) the majority of offenders are adolescents, 2) almost 50% of these
offenders desist from offending by their early 20s, and 3) by the late 20s, almost 85% of
previous teenage offenders have desisted from offending (Moffitt, 1993). Second,
developmental research has shown that key cognitive areas associated with decision
making, consequence consideration, and impulse control, do not fully develop until
young adulthood (e.g., age 20-25; Steinberg, 2007, 2008).
A randomized experimental design comprised of adolescent and both young and
older adult participants. All participants were questioned about their engagement in
various criminal and unethical behaviors. Participants were told responding “yes” or
“no” to these questions had either immediate (e.g., answering burdensome, repetitive
questions) or future consequences (e.g., meeting with the police to discuss interview
responses at a later date). Future orientation, impulse control, and sensation seeking were
also measured. Experiential factors may also influence individuals’ willingness to admit
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involvement in criminal and unethical behaviors. For that reason, participants were also
asked to provide information on their past legal system involvement and understanding of
Miranda rights. Self-reported legal system involvement and Miranda comprehension
scores were used as a control in some of the subsequent analyses.
Hypotheses
Extant research findings and proposed underlying theoretical mechanisms
discussed above, were used to formulate hypotheses for the current study. Overall, I
predicted that temporal discounting would influence participants’ rates of admission to
having engaged in criminal and unethical behaviors and that the tendency to provide
admissions would be stronger for (a) adolescents than adults, (b) individuals with lower
impulse control (c) individuals with less future orientation, and (d) individuals with
higher levels of self-reported sensation seeking. For all hypotheses, no specific
predictions were made regarding the two adult groups (i.e., older vs. young adults).
Differences were not predicted between these two age groups because the expected
presence of cognitive differences is likely dependent on the mean age of each sample of
adults. The following key predictions were made:
Hypothesis 1. A main effect of age group was expected. Specifically, I
hypothesized that youth would provide more admissions than adults. Also, a main effect
of consequences condition was expected. That is, I expected that more admissions would
be provided when proximal consequences were associated with denials rather than when
proximal consequences were associated with admissions. An interaction was expected
between age group and consequences condition such that youth would provide more
admissions than adults when denials were associated with proximal consequences
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compared to when admissions were associated with proximal consequences. Thus, it was
expected that youth would succumb more than adults to the phenomenon of temporal
discounting (i.e., the tendency for behavior to be influenced more strongly by proximal
than distal factors; Berns et al., 2007; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001), particularly when
denials, rather than admissions, were associated with proximal consequences.
Hypothesis 2. A main effect of age group on impulse control was expected.
Specifically, I hypothesized that youth would have lower levels of impulse control than
adults. The main effect was expected to be qualified by a 3-way interaction between age
group, consequences condition, and impulse control. Specifically, the interaction
between age group and consequences condition was expected to vary based on impulse
control. It was expected that impulse control would influence youths’ admission
decisions such that youth with lower levels of impulse control would provide more
admissions than youth with higher levels of impulse control when denials were associated
with proximal consequences but not when admissions were associated with proximal
consequences. Impulse control was expected to have a less robust effect on adults’
admission decisions.
Hypothesis 3. A main effect of age group on future orientation was expected
such that youth were expected to be less future oriented than adults. I predicted that the
main effect would be qualified by a 3-way interaction between age group, consequences
condition, and future orientation. Specifically, the interaction between age group and
consequences condition was expected to vary based on future orientation. That is, it was
expected that future orientation would influence youths’ admissions decisions such that
youth with lower levels of future orientation were expected to succumb more to the
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proximal consequences of the interrogation situation than youth with higher levels of
future orientation when denials, rather than admissions, were associated with proximal
consequences. Because adults are less likely to experience deficits in future orientation,
it was expected that future orientation would have a less robust effect on adults’
admission decisions.
Hypothesis 4. A main effect of age group on sensation seeking was expected.
That is, I expected youth to exhibit higher levels of sensation seeking than adults. I
hypothesized that this main effect would be qualified by a 3-way interaction between age
group, consequences condition, and sensation seeking. Specifically, the interaction
between age group and consequences condition was expected to vary based on sensation
seeking. Thus, it was expected that sensation seeking would influence youths’
admissions decisions such that youth with lower levels of sensation seeking would
provide more admissions than youth with higher levels of sensation seeking when denials
were associated with proximal consequences but not when admissions were associated
with proximal consequences. Sensation seeking was expected to have a less robust effect
on adults’ admission decisions.
Hypothesis 5: Impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking were
hypothesized to mediate and completely account for the observed relationship between
age group and number of admissions made during the interview (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Proposed Model of Mediation.
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II. METHOD
Design
The study conformed to a 3 (Age Group) X 2 (Consequences Condition) between
subjects factorial design. Adults and adolescents (Age Group: adolescent vs. young adult
vs. older adult) were randomly assigned to one of two consequences conditions
(Consequences Condition: proximal consequence for denials-distal consequence for
admissions [PCD-DCA] vs. proximal consequence for admissions-distal consequence for
denials [PCA-DCD]). Participants’ admissions and denials to the criminal and unethical
behavior (CUB) interview questions was the primary dependent measure of interest.
Secondary dependent measures were participants’ future orientation, impulsivity, and
sensation seeking scores.
Sample
Power analysis. A power analysis indicated that a sample of 190 participants
(approximately 32 participants per condition with 64 older adult, 64 young adult, and 64
adolescent participants) would provide 80% power to detect group mean differences of a
relatively small (0.3) effect size, using an F test with a .05 significance level.
Characteristics. Two groups of adult participants were recruited for the current
study. In an attempt to assess developmental differences across a wider age range than
has been studied in previous research, I expanded the adult population of interest in the
current study. Thus, data was collected from both young and older adults. For the
purpose of the present study, young adults were classified as individuals age 18 to 24 and
older adults were classified as individuals age 25 and above.
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The final sample comprised 205 participants (78 older adults, 74 young adults,
and 53 adolescents). Older adults were college undergraduate students (59% female)
ages 25 years and older (Mage = 28.68, SD = 4.55) who identified as Hispanic (70%),
African American (14%), Caucasian (8%), or Other (8%). Two older adults with ages
more than three standard deviations above the mean were excluded from analyses.
Young adults were college undergraduate students (76% female) ages 18 to 24 years
(Mage = 20.51, SD = 1.63) who identified as Hispanic (55%), African American (19%),
Caucasian (11%), and Other (15%). Adolescents were middle and high school students
(60% female) ages 12 to 17 years (Mage = 14.75, SD = 1.65) who identified as Hispanic
(74%), African American (2%), Caucasian (17%), or Other (7%).
Recruitment. All adult participants were recruited via SONA systems, an
electronic research management and participant recruitment system, at a large urban
university in exchange for extra credit. Adolescent participants were recruited from local
middle and high schools, other youth-oriented programs, and via announcements made to
faculty and undergraduate students in departments across the university. In exchange for
their participation, adolescents received community service hours, which are a
requirement for many local schools (Pimentel et al., 2015). Adolescent participants also
received a $25 Target gift card to compensate them for their time and travel to the
university laboratory.
Informed consent/assent. The informed consent/assent process was similar
across all three age groups, with the exception that simpler language was used with
adolescent participants and that adolescents’ parent(s) or legal guardian(s) had to provide
informed consent in order for them to participate.
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Young and older adult participants were provided with a consent form with the
study details to read on their own. RAs were close by during this time to answer
participants’ questions.
In order for adolescents to participate in the study, informed consent had to be
received from their parent(s) or legal guardian(s). I conversed with all of the adolescents’
parents or legal guardians (either by phone and/or email), prior to adolescents’ study
appointment. Also, all parent(s) or legal guardian(s) of interested participants received an
email explaining the true purpose of the study, study procedures, instructions not to share
this information with the adolescent, and specific information for what to say to their
child or guardian if s/he had questions prior to participating in the study. The informed
consent form was attached to the email for parents and or legal guardians to review prior
to the scheduled appointment. All parents and legal guardians were encouraged to reach
out with questions at any time.
Parents or legal guardians were not required to accompany adolescents to the
study. Those who chose not to accompany the adolescent, were instructed to send the
completed consent form in a sealed envelope with the adolescent to the study. I engaged
all parents and legal guardians who chose to accompany the adolescent to the study in an
in-person informed consent process. During this process, the true purpose and
procedures of the study were disclosed and background information on the significance
of the research question was provided. Additionally, parent(s) and legal guardian(s) were
apprised as to how the findings of the study were intended to be used (e.g., published in
peer reviewed journals, disseminated to law enforcement, potentially to inform police
interrogation policies). All parents and legal guardians were then given ample time to
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ask me questions about the study before choosing whether or not to consent to their
child’s participation in the study. During this process, adolescent participants were in a
separate room with a RA.
After receiving informed consent from adolescents’ parent(s) or legal guardian(s),
assent procedures ensued with adolescent participants. Specifically, adolescent
participants were informed how long the study would take (i.e., 3-4 hours), what they
would be doing (i.e., answering some questionnaires on paper, on the computer, and faceto-face with a RA), what they would receive for participating (i.e., volunteer hours and a
$25 gift card), and that they could discontinue their participation in the study at any time
without consequence. I also wanted to ensure that adolescents did not feel pressured to
participate simply because their parent or legal guardian had consented. That is, I wanted
to ensure that adolescent participants were aware they could choose not to participate or
to stop participating at any time even though their parent or legal guardian had provided
consent. To ensure participation was voluntary, adolescent participants were told that,
even though their parents had consented, adolescents did not have to participate in the
study if they did not want to. And, if they chose not to participate there would be no
negative consequences or costs to them or their parent(s) or legal guardian(s).
Adolescents were then provided with a paper copy of the assent form to read. RAs were
close by to answer adolescents’ questions.
Procedure
Because of the nature and complexity of the research design, RAs underwent
extensive training (i.e., 6 to 8 weeks) regarding the study procedures and administration
of questionnaires prior to conducting experimental sessions with eligible research
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participants. All RAs had to submit to and pass memorization testing of key components
of the study protocol and administration of the MRCI-II measures before being allowed
to collect data with participants. To account for drift over time, all RAs were periodically
(i.e., every three to four months) retested. Also, I observed multiple practice sessions
with each RA supplying them with detailed feedback about their performance with real
participants. Data collected during practice sessions was not included as part of the final
data set. All RAs were required to successfully complete these practice sessions before
collecting the data that contributed to this dissertation.
Participants arrived to the laboratory with the belief that s/he would be
participating in a study examining student behaviors. After obtaining informed consent
and providing the cover story, participants were asked to provide their name, email
address, cell phone number, and student identification number (Appendix A). Contact
information was collected in order to bolster belief that the police officer would be able
to reach her/him to schedule a meeting in the future if necessary. Participants then
completed the CUB interview and impulse control, future orientation, and sensation
seeking measures. The order of the CUB interview and impulse control, future
orientation, and sensation seeking measures was counterbalanced and presented in a
random order across participants so as not to affect performance on other relevant
measures. Specifically, following random assignment, half of the participants completed
the measures before and half completed the measures after the CUB interview.
Following the interview, participants completed self-report questionnaires to assess
demographic information, suspicion, and their understanding of the Consequences
experimental manipulation. Finally, participants’ comprehension of Miranda rights was
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assessed before they were debriefed, completed a second, self-administered CUB
interview, thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
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Consent

Study
Description

Contact
Information
? for No
Impulse Control,
Future
Orientation, &
Sensation
Seeking
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(random order)

CUB Interview
? for Yes
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(random order)

? for No
CUB Interview
? for Yes
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Checks

Miranda
Comprehension
Measures
Debriefing
SelfAdministered
CUB Interview

Figure 2. Flow Chart of the Experimental Procedure.
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Materials, Measures, and Coding
Cover story and interview room. Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants
were told that they would be participating in a study examining the amount and types of
criminal and unethical behaviors college/middle and high school students (depending on
Age Group condition) have engaged in. To assess this, participants were told they would
be interviewed by a research assistant (RA) involved in the study in which s/he would be
asked a series of yes-no questions regarding his/her engagement in a variety of criminal
and unethical behaviors (Appendix B). Furthermore, participants were told the study was
a collaboration between professors in the Psychology Department and police officers
within the Miami-Dade police department.
A number of props were used to support the cover story (Appendices A, C, D).
All participants were individually interviewed in a small, brightly lit, white walled room
containing only a small desk/table, two chairs (one for the participant and the other for
the RA), and a laptop computer. Two colored flyers were obtained from the Miami-Dade
Police Department website and were affixed to the wall directly above the laptop
computer. The flyers offered safety tips for conducting internet sales transactions
(Appendix D) and information about the local juvenile curfew ordinance (Appendix D).
Both flyers clearly displayed the Miami-Dade Police Department emblem. In addition, a
pencil cup placed next to the laptop computer contained multiple pens which were each
engraved with the words “Miami-Dade Police Department.” No other writing utensils
were made available to participants during the study. Finally, RAs were clothed in white
lab coats and wore lanyards printed with the words “Miami-Dade Police.”
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Consequences scripts. Prior to completing the face-to-face interview with the
RA, participants were given different instructions based on consequence condition.
Participants in both experimental consequence conditions were told that their responses
(i.e., whether they admit or deny engaging in the behaviors) to the criminal and unethical
behavior interview questions would constitute immediate (proximal) or future (distal)
consequences. The immediate (proximal) consequence involved answering a series of 32
burdensome and repetitive questions during the study session. The future (distal)
consequence was potentially having to meet with a police officer at the police station in
several weeks to discuss their responses. The precise number of admissions/denials that
would require participants to have this meeting was never specified.
By design, the type and severity of the consequence is confounded with its
proximity. Thus, any observed differences may not reflect a tendency for individuals to
admit criminal and unethical behaviors to avoid the immediate (proximal) consequences
rather than the future (distal) consequences, but, instead, to avoid the repetitive questions
rather than meet with the police officer. However, past research (see Madon et al., 2012),
which has reversed the consequences (i.e., the immediate [proximal] consequence was
the meeting with the police officer and the future [distal] consequence was responding to
the repetitive questions) indicates this is of little concern in the current study. When the
consequences were reversed, this research continued to support the temporal discounting
theory with participants’ responses reflecting a tendency to avoid the proximal
consequences, regardless of what the proximal consequence entailed (i.e., meeting with a
police officer or answering additional questions; Madon et al., 2012). Since the
publication of the initial studies, researchers employing this paradigm have used only the
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standard consequence contingency pairing (i.e., the proximal consequence is always
answering the set of 32 repetitive questions and the distal consequence is always the
potential meeting with the police officer; Madon et al., 2013; Scherr, Miller, & Kassin,
2014; Yang, Madon, & Guyll, 2015).
Proximal consequence: Repetitive questions. Repetitive questions (Appendix E)
were adapted from Madon and colleagues (2012, 2013). Depending on condition,
participants received the immediate (proximal) consequence of answering a set of 32
repetitive questions assessing participants’ perceptions of how the “average Floridian”
and “average American” would feel (e.g., hostile, jealous, happy-go-lucky) while
engaging in the criminal or unethical behavior they just admitted or denied engaging in.
Participants answered the repetitive questions on a computer with a 4-s delay between
each question. In total, the entire set of 32 repetitive questions required approximately
seven minutes to complete. These questions were, by design, burdensome and repetitive.
The sole purpose of the repetitive questions was to serve as a consequence for admitting
or denying having engaged in the behavior in question. Thus, we were not interested in
analyzing the actual responses to these questions.
To ensure all participants experienced the tedious nature of the repetitive
questions, each interview began with a “practice question” supposedly designed to
familiarize participants with the interview procedures. In reality, practice questions were
designed to elicit a response from participants that would require them to answer the
repetitive questions. For example, participants assigned to answer the repetitive
questions for each admission (“yes” response) to the CUB interview questions were
asked whether s/he had ever littered (any material, biodegradable or otherwise, either on
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purpose or on accident). Participants assigned to answer the repetitive questions for each
denial (“no” response) to the CUB interview questions were asked whether s/he had ever
faked a high school diploma.
If participants failed to give the desired response, the RA feigned a computer
malfunction. That is, the computer program was designed to display an error message
and to fail to advance to the real CUB interview questions when the desired response
(i.e., responses requiring that participants answer the repetitive questions) was not given.
The RA then left the room to allegedly call a graduate supervisor for advice on handling
the situation. Upon returning to the room, the RA stated that there was a problem with
the computer program for that question but that the graduate supervisor was currently
unable to fix it. The RA then indicated that the graduate supervisor had instructed
him/her to try selecting the other answer option (i.e., the response requiring that the
participant answer the repetitive questions) to advance the program. Upon selecting the
alternative answer option, the computer would advance to the repetitive questions. RAs
then informed the participant that they would need to answer the repetitive questions to
advance to the real CUB interview questions, despite the fact that their original response
did not necessitate answering these questions. All participants were informed that there
appeared to be a computer glitch only for this question. Finally, RAs reminded all
participants that during the real CUB interview s/he would only have to answer the
repetitive questions, depending on Consequence condition, for each admission or denial.
Again, the computer malfunction occurred only for those participants that failed to give
the desired response to the practice question. Participants who gave the desired response
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were not informed of a computer malfunction. The purpose of the computer malfunction
was to ensure all participants had experience with the repetitive questions at least once.
Distal consequence: Meeting with police officer. Depending on condition,
responses to the CUB interview questions increased the likelihood that participants
received the future (distal) consequence of meeting with the police officer. Participants
were told that the tendency to admit (answer “yes” to the interview questions) or deny
(answer “no” to the interview questions) engaging in these behaviors would result in
them having to meet with one of the police officers involved in the study at the police
station in a few weeks. All participants were told that the purpose of this meeting would
be to discuss their interview responses in depth with a police officer.
Proximal consequence for admissions-distal consequence for denials (PCADCD). Participants in the PCA-DCD condition were told that they had to answer
additional follow-up questions on a computer during their session every time they
responded “yes” to one of the CUB interview questions. Participants were told that this
was necessary in order for researchers to obtain additional information about the behavior
in question. However, participants were told they would be signed up to meet with a
police officer involved in the research at a later date if they tended to answer “no” to the
CUB interview questions. All participants were told that the purpose of the meeting was
for law enforcement personnel to obtain more detailed information about their
engagement in criminal and unethical behaviors. Furthermore, participants were told
police officers would contact them directly to schedule this meeting.
Proximal consequence for denials-distal consequence for admissions (PCDDCA). Participants in the PCD-DCA condition were told the reverse of participants in
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the PCA-DCD condition. That is, these participants were told that they would have to
answer additional follow-up questions on the computer during their session every time
they gave a “no” response to one of the CUB interview questions. However, participants
expected to meet with a police officer to discuss their responses in depth if they tended to
answer “yes” to these CUB interview questions.
Interview questions. Interview questions (Appendix B) were adapted from
Madon and colleagues (2012, 2013) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (2014). Questions assessed whether
participants had ever engaged in 20 criminal (e.g., engaged in underage drinking, illegally
downloading music, movies, or software) and unethical (e.g., reading another’s text
messages or emails without permission, starting or spreading a rumor about someone)
behaviors. To ensure participants felt comfortable providing answers to questions of a
personal nature, participants were told that none of the members of the research team
would judge them for or share the responses they provided during their session.
Participants were required to admit or deny having engaged in each behavior during an
interview aloud by responding “yes” (coded as 1) or “no” (coded as 0) to each question.
Coded responses were summed to create total admission and denial scores for each
participant.
In this well-established paradigm, participants’ responses to the interview
questions are classified as admissions or denials. However, it is important to note that it
is not possible to determine ground truth of any particular response. In an attempt to
address this limitation, participants in the present study were also asked to provide honest
responses to the interview questions after the true purpose of the study had been revealed.
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Measures. A variety of measures were administered to assess participant’s level
of impulse control, future orientation, sensation seeking, comprehension of rights during
police questioning, and experiences with the legal system. Impulse control was assessed
via both self-report and behavioral measures. The rest of the measures relied solely on
self-report.
Counterbalancing. The order of these measures and the CUB interview were
counterbalanced. That is, some participants were randomly assigned to complete the
impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking measures before the CUB
interview, whereas others completed them afterwards. Counterbalancing was done to
ensure the order of the presentation of the measures did not affect other relevant study
measures. Furthermore, impulse control and future orientation measures were presented
in random order to each participant.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995;
Appendix F). The BIS-11 is the most commonly administered measure for assessing
impulsiveness in research and clinical settings (Stanford et al., 2009). This measure is
comprised of 30-items assessed on a four-point (rarely/never to almost always/always)
Likert scale. Sample items include the following: “I do things without thinking.”; “I plan
tasks carefully.” Several items were reverse coded for analysis. Responses to the 30items were summed to create a total impulsivity score with higher scores indicating
greater susceptibility to impulsivity and, thus, lower impulse control.
Circle tracing task (Bachorowski & Newman, 1985). Behavioral impulse control
was assessed with a circle tracing task (Appendix G). This task (or similar
tracing/drawing tasks) has been used to assess behavioral impulse control with children
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(Avila, Cuenca, Felix, Parcet, & Miranda, 2004; Homatidis & Kostantareas, 1981),
juvenile delinquents (Siegman, 1961; White et al., 1994), and adults (Bachorowski &
Newman, 1985, 1990; Stuart & Holtzworth-Munroe, 2005). Participants were asked to
trace a 9” diameter circle as slowly as possible. Tracing time (in seconds) was the main
measure of interest. To ensure timely study completion, a maximum time limit of 8
minutes was set for this task. Experimenters stopped participants who were still
completing the task after 8 minutes to move on to the next task. Only three participants
(1 older adult, 1 young adult, and 1 adolescent) used the full 8 minutes to complete this
task.
Future orientation. The tendency to consider future consequences, outcomes,
and rewards was assessed with a 15-item self-report measure (Steinberg et al., 2009;
Appendix H) that has been used with both adolescents and adults. This measure consists
of pairs of statements from which participants were instructed to choose the statement
that best described them. Participants then indicated whether the description was really
true or sort of true of them. Sample item pairs include the following: “Some people
would rather be happy today than take their chances on what might happen in the future
BUT Other people will give up their happiness now so that they can get what they want in
the future”; “Some people like to think about all of the possible good and bad things that
can happen before making a decision BUT Other people don’t think it’s necessary to
think about every little possibility before making a decision.” Using this format (i.e.,
presenting participants with pairs of statements separated by the word “but” and asking
participants to choose the statement that best describes them) has been used in previous
research and is thought to reduce social desirability in responding (Harter, 1982;
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Steinberg et al., 2009). Responses were coded on a 4-point scale, ranging from really
true for one descriptor to really true for the other. Scores were then averaged to create an
overall future orientation score with higher scores indicating greater future orientation.
Sensation seeking. Participant's level of sensation seeking was assessed with a
self-report measure (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011; Appendix I). Sensation seeking was
measured based on participant's responses to the following three items: "I enjoy taking
risks"; "I enjoy new and exciting experiences, even if they are a little frightening or
unusual"; "Life with no danger in it would be too dull for me." Participants responded to
all items on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree). Scores were then averaged to create a mean sensation seeking score with higher
scores indicating greater sensation seeking.
Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments - II (MRCI-II). Prior to
undergoing custodial interrogation, police must inform suspects of their Miranda rights
(e.g., rights to silence and legal counsel). Individuals may choose to either waive –
which many choose to do (three out of every four real-world criminal suspects waived
their rights in one study; Leo, 1996b) – or invoke these Miranda rights. The same risk
factors hypothesized in the current study as putting youth at increased risk of falsely
confessing, also may make youth less capable of voluntarily and knowingly waiving the
legal rights afforded to them as suspects undergoing custodial interrogation. In fact,
comprehension deficits tend to be most pronounced among justice involved youth and
adults (Grisso et al., 2003). Thus, to control for this possibility in subsequent analyses,
two Miranda comprehension measures were employed. Miranda comprehension scores
were used as a control in some of the subsequent analyses.
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Participants' comprehension of their Miranda rights was assessed with the MRCIII (Goldstein, Zelle, & Grisso, 2014). This measure consists of four instruments that
were each designed to assess a different aspect of individuals' understanding of their
Miranda rights. Specifically, the instruments were designed to assess an individual’s
understanding of the meaning of their Miranda rights and appreciation for and
consequences associated with waiving those rights. The instruments do not allow for the
assessment of an individual’s competency to waive his or her Miranda rights.
The MRCI-II was created for use with both adolescents and adults. Measurement
norms were developed with data collected from samples of juvenile justice involved
youth (i.e., youth housed in a residential post-adjudication facility, detention center, or
short-term holding facility), middle to upper-middle SES community youth, and adult
offenders (Goldstein et al., 2014). For the purposes of this study, time only allowed for
the administration of two of the four instruments: Comprehension of Miranda RightsRecognition-II (CMR-R-II) and Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).
Comprehension of Miranda Rights - Recognition - II (CMR-R-II). The CMR-R-II
was designed to assess comprehension of the five Miranda warnings (e.g., right to
silence, right to counsel, etc.). However, instead of relying on verbal expressive skills,
the CMR-R-II assesses Miranda comprehension through recognition. The CMR-R-II
presents three pre-constructed sentences for each of the five Miranda warnings (see
Appendix J). Participants are instructed to report whether each sentence is or is not
identical in meaning to the original Miranda warning to which it is paired. Scoring for
the CMR-R-II is dichotomous, with incorrect responses receiving 0 points and correct
responses receiving 1 point. Thus, summed total scores on this measure can range from 0
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(i.e., incorrect recognition of each of the 15 pre-constructed sentences) to 15 (i.e., correct
recognition of each of the 15 pre-constructed sentences).
Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI). The FRI was designed to assess
individuals’ ability to appreciate and apply Miranda rights in various legal proceedings
(Appendix K). While individuals may understand that they have the “right to remain
silent,” they may fail to appreciate its significance in the context of an interrogation or in
court. For this instrument, experimenters read four scenarios aloud to participants. Each
scenario was accompanied by a picture related to and depicting a legal proceeding (e.g., a
suspect being questioned by police, a suspect meeting with an attorney, a defendant in
court). Participants' appreciation of the significance of and the ability to apply their
rights was assessed via 15 standardized questions. RAs followed up with standardized
queries as necessary. The questions were designed to assess whether individuals
recognized the adverse nature of interrogation and grasped both the significance of the
right to counsel and the right to silence. Responses are considered inadequate,
questionable, or adequate, and scored 0, 1, or 2, respectively (see Table 1 for sample
scoring of this measure). Total scores on this measure can range from 0 (i.e., inadequate
responses to all 15 questions) to 30 (i.e., adequate responses to all 15 questions).
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Table 1
Sample Scoring Scheme for Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).
Response Type
FRI Sample Items

Adequate Response

Questionable Response

Inadequate Response

What is it that the policemen will want Joe
to do?

Tell them where he
was at the time of the
crime.

Talk about something.

Act with good
manners.

While he is with his lawyer, what is Tim
supposed to do?

Trust him and do what
the lawyer thinks is
best.

Listen to what the
lawyer’s saying.

Plead the fifth.

Finish this sentence. If Greg decides to tell
the police about what he did, then the
things that Greg says __________.

Can be used against
him in court.

Can get him into
trouble.

Won’t matter anyway.

If the judge finds out that Greg wouldn’t
talk to the police, then what should
happen?

The judge will listen
to what everybody
else has to say.

Ask Greg why he
wouldn’t talk.

Make him talk now.
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MRCI-II scoring. All MRCI-II assessment sessions were audio recorded and
transcribed verbatim. Because the CMR-R-II is scored in a purely objective manner, I
independently scored all participant responses for this measure. Using standardized
scoring procedures (Goldstein et al., 2014), two scorers independently scored
participants’ transcribed responses to the FRI. A primary scorer, blind to both Age
Group and Consequences condition, scored all FRI responses. Fifteen percent of the data
was randomly selected to be independently co-scored by a second scorer to establish
inter-rater reliability. Prior to scoring for reliability, both scorers underwent intensive
training according to standardized scoring rules. Kappa coefficients were calculated for
each item in the measure to account for/represent variability within each item. Inter-rater
agreement was examined with intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC; Suen & Ary,
1989) for each subscale and the total FRI score, representing total score variability. An
average ICC of 0.95 and an average Kappa coefficient of 0.88 were observed. These ICC
values represent “almost perfect” agreement; Kappa values represent “substantial” to
“almost perfect” agreement (McHugh, 2012). The Kappa coefficients for the individual
items ranged from 0.70 to 1.00. See Table 2 for all inter-rater reliability statistics for this
measure. Miranda Comprehension scores were used as a control in most of the primary
analyses.
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Table 2
Inter-rater Reliability Estimates for the Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).
ICC

Kappa

.93***

¾

.96***

¾

NI-1

¾

1.0***

NI-2

¾

1.0***

NI-3

¾

¾a

NI-4

¾

.73***

NI-5

¾

.70***

.97***

¾

RC-1

¾

1.0***

RC-2

¾

¾a

RC-3

¾

1.0***

RC-4

¾

.84***

RC-5

¾

.79***

.94***

¾

RS-1

¾

.81***

RS-2

¾

.91***

RS-3

¾

¾a

RS-4

¾

.84***

RS-5

¾

.93***

FRI Total
NI Subscale

RC Subscale

RS Subscale

Note. aKappa could not be calculated because raters did not assign the full range of scores
(0-2) for these items. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Familiarity with the legal system. Extant research has demonstrated that prior
experience with the law and/or legal system can influence individuals' knowledge and
appreciation of Miranda rights (Leo, 1996a; Scherr, 2011; Softley, 1980). To control for
this potential influence, all participants were asked to indicate whether they had ever been
arrested, questioned by police, placed in juvenile detention or jail, and/or gone to court or
been placed on probation (Appendix L). Participants who reported having these
experiences, also answered questions about the number of times this had occurred and the
timing of the most recent occurrence (e.g., 2-3 months ago, one year ago, 5 years ago).
From this data, a dichotomous justice system involvement variable was created (0 =
never had prior justice system involvement, 1 = ever had prior justice system
involvement). Those participants who self-reported having been arrested, questioned by
police as a suspect, experience in court or on probation, or served time in juvenile
detention or jail, were coded as 1 (ever had prior justice system involvement).
Participants who did not report having any of these experiences, were coded as 0 (never
had prior justice system involvement). Self-reported prior justice system involvement
was used as a control in all of the primary analyses involving the Miranda measures.
Manipulation check items. Comprehension of the consequence manipulation
was assessed both before and after the interview. Prior to the interview, RAs asked
participants to explain what would happen when s/he responded “yes” and “no” to the
interview questions. For participants who failed to adequately grasp their experimental
Consequences condition, experimenters repeated an abbreviated version of the
consequence script and assessed comprehension a second time. This process was
repeated until participants demonstrated adequate comprehension of their Consequences
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condition. All participants were able to adequately demonstrate comprehension prior to
the interview.
After completing the CUB interview, participants completed questionnaires
(Appendix M) containing Consequences condition manipulation check items.
Specifically, participants were asked whether they answered the repetitive questions
when they (1) gave a “yes” response, (2) gave a “no” response, or (3) sometimes when
they gave a “no” response and sometimes when they gave a “yes” response.
Perceived aversiveness of the repetitive questions (proximal consequence).
Participants were also asked several questions to assess the perceived aversiveness of the
repetitive questions (Appendix M). Specifically, participants were asked eight questions
about their perceptions of the repetitive questions. Five of these items were bipolar
adjective scales participants used to rate the degree to which the repetitive questions
were, (1) soothing – irritating; (2) varied – repetitive; (3) interesting – boring; (4)
pleasant – unpleasant; and (5) enjoyable – annoying. Scores were then averaged for
these five items to create an overall question aversion scale. The sixth item asked
participants, “If you could, how much would you have liked to have skipped the
additional questions about Floridians and Americans altogether?” Participants provided
their response using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a lot). The
seventh item assessed how tempted participants were to change their answers to avoid
answering the additional questions (“Overall, how tempted were you to give a particular
answer on the criminal and unethical behaviors survey just to avoid having to answer the
additional questions about Floridians and Americans again?) on a 1 (not at all tempted)
to 5 (very tempted) scale. Finally, participants were asked, “How glad were you when the
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additional questions about Floridians and Americans were completely done?” using a 1
(not at all glad) to 5 (very glad) scale. Thus, a total of four dependent variables were
used to assess question aversiveness: (1) the question aversion scale, (2) the desire to skip
the repetitive questions, (3) the temptation to change answers to avoid the repetitive
questions, and (4) feeling glad when the repetitive questions were finished. Higher
scores were indicative of greater perceived aversiveness to the repetitive questions for all
resulting dependent variables.
Perceived aversiveness of the meeting with a police officer (distal
consequence). Similarly, six items were also included to assess participants’ perceptions
of the aversiveness of meeting with a police officer (Appendix M). The first five items
were bipolar adjective scales. Participants were asked to rate their feelings about the
possible meeting with the police officer using the following adjective pairs: (1) nervous –
calm; (2) reluctant – eager; (3) unenthused – enthused; (4) concerned – unconcerned;
and (5) not looking forward to – looking forward to. Items were reverse coded so that
higher scores were indicative of greater perceived aversiveness regarding meeting with a
police officer. Scores were then averaged for these five items to create an overall police
aversion scale. Finally, participants used a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a
lot) to indicate how much they hoped they would not have to meet with a police officer to
discuss their responses to the CUB interview. Thus, a total of two dependent variables
were used to assess police aversiveness: (1) the police aversion scale and (2) the hope
that the participant would not have to meet with a police officer. Higher scores were
indicative of greater perceived aversiveness to the police for all resulting dependent
variables.
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Suspicion check items. Two approaches were used to determine whether
participants were suspicious about any aspect of the study, particularly the potential
meeting with the police officer. Following the CUB interview, participants completed a
questionnaire specifically inquiring as to whether s/he believed the researchers were
examining a research question other than the one stated at the beginning of the
experiment (Appendix N). Participants responding in the affirmative were asked to
specifically indicate what research question(s) s/he believed were under investigation.
RAs further probed for suspicion during the debriefing (Appendix O). Specifically, RAs
asked participants: (1) what s/he thought about the study; (2) if anything about the study
was unusual; and (3) whether s/he believed s/he had been misled. RAs instructed
participants to elaborate on their original responses as necessary.
Demographics. All participants were asked to provide demographic information
regarding their race/ethnicity, age, gender, grade point average, highest level of academic
achievement, and native language (Appendix L). Additionally, participants were asked
whether they had taken or were currently taking courses relevant to the current study
(e.g., Legal Psychology, Cognitive Processes, Juvenile Justice, The Criminal Justice
System).
Debriefing. At the conclusion of the study, an extensive debriefing process
ensued (Appendix O). During the debriefing session, participants were asked a series of
questions to probe for suspicion (discussed above) and to acquire information about
participant’s experiences in the study. Immediately following this questioning, the true
purpose of the study was revealed. Importantly, all participants were informed of the
following:
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1. No police officers were involved in the study;
2. There would be no legal or any other consequences for participants based on their
responses to the CUB interview questions;
3. Only de-identified, anonymous information provided during the study session
would be reported and presented to the public.
After learning the true purpose of the study, all participants were informed of the
importance of not sharing this information with other people who might participate in the
study in the future. After providing verbal consent not to share the true purpose of the
study with others, all participants were then asked to sign a confidentiality agreement
(Appendix P).
In an attempt to measure ground truth of participants’ actual engagement in these
criminal and unethical behaviors all participants, now knowledgeable of the true purpose
of the study, were asked to provide truthful responses to the CUB interview questions.
All participants then completed the CUB interview again (Appendix Q). However, this
time participants were fully aware that there would be no consequences based on their
responses and were encouraged to provide only truthful responses. Participants
completed the measure alone (i.e., without the RA or any members of the research team
present in the testing room).
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III. RESULTS
The primary dependent variable of interest in the current study is the number of
admissions provided during the CUB interview. The primary independent variables of
interest are Age group, Consequences condition, impulse control, future orientation, and
sensation seeking scores.
Analysis Plan
First, I present a series of preliminary analyses. Second, I describe the primary
analyses testing the hypotheses concerning the effects of age group, consequences
condition, and future orientation, impulse control, and sensation seeking on admissions
decisions. Finally, I present exploratory analyses in an attempt to explain the lack of
support for predicted age group differences on temporal discounting, impulse control,
future orientation, and sensation seeking in the primary analyses.
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were conducted to assess the presence of outliers and a
normal distribution of the primary dependent measure. The influence of
counterbalancing the measures and possible gender differences in the measures of interest
were assessed. Additionally, manipulation check and suspicion checks were conducted.
This included an assessment of the perceived level of aversiveness to answering
repetitive questions and the possible meeting with a police officer. Analysis of
manipulation checks is to ensure that all participants correctly understood the
consequences associated with their interview responses. Participants who incorrectly
classified their Consequences condition or who noted elevated levels of suspicion
regarding relevant study procedures were excluded from subsequent analyses.
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Testing normality of the dependent variable. The primary dependent measure
of interest in all analyses was the admissions rate, or the sum of the number of times
participants said “yes” in response to questions asked about their involvement in various
criminal and unethical behaviors (Table 3). The distribution of the primary dependent
variable was assessed both visually, by examining histograms, Q-Q plots, and P-P plots,
and statistically, by examining skewness and kurtosis values and conducting statistical
tests (e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks tests). Visual analysis revealed that
the dependent variable appeared to be positively skewed. A Shapiro-Wilks test
confirmed visual evidence of a non-normally distributed dependent variable, W = .96, p
= .001. Because the admissions rate was positively skewed, I attempted to normalize the
distribution of the data by performing a square root transformation. After performing the
transformation, visual and statistical examination revealed that the admissions rate
continued to reveal non-normality, W = .97, p < .01. Thus, the square root transformation
did not improve the distribution of the data. Because several of the statistical tests (e.g.,
Analysis of Variance) used for analyses are robust to non-normality (Schmider, Ziegler,
Danay, Beyer, & Bühner, 2010), the raw score for number of admissions was used in all
subsequent analyses.
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Table 3
Number (and Percent) of Participant Admissions to the Criminal and Unethical Behavior Interview Questions as a Function of
Age Group.
Number of Admissions (%)
Older Adults

Young Adults

Adolescents

40 (76%)

37 (82%)

19 (44%)

24 (45%)

18 (40%)

3 (7%)

29 (55%)

26 (58%)

20 (47%)

37 (70%)

26 (58%)

26 (61%)

17 (32%)

11 (24%)

8 (19%)

33 (62%)
24 (45%)

30 (67%)
12 (27%)

29 (67%)
3 (7%)

11 (21%)

1 (2%)

3 (7%)

34 (64%)

24 (53%)

16 (37%)

Have you ever…
1. Drank (even just one sip), bought, or tried to buy alcohol before you
were 21?
2. Tried, used, or experimented with any illegal drugs such as marijuana,
cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other kind of drug even just one time?
3. Cheated on an exam, paper, homework assignment, or school project
by taking credit for someone else’s work, ideas, or answers as your
own (plagiarism) or helped another person cheat?
4. Used something that belonged to somebody else without permission,
such as something that belonged to a family member, friend,
roommate, or acquaintance?
5. Made a harassing, threatening, or prank phone call, text message, or
social media post or private message?
6. Failed to wear a seat belt?
7. Knowingly kept something of value that you received in error, such as
extra change given to you by a cashier or extra merchandise from a
store or from an internet purchase?
8. Vandalized property, like keying a car, slashing a tire, spraying
graffiti, or egging a house or car?
9. Invaded another’s privacy such as by reading another’s diary, text
messages, or emails without permission?
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10. Jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie theater or
grocery store?
11. Purposefully not returned something that you borrowed like a book,
clothing, or money?
12. Engaged in a nonviolent sex offense such as by exposing yourself to
someone by mooning or flashing them or engaged in voyeurism,
which is being a peeping Tom?
13. Started or spread a rumor about someone?
14. Assaulted someone with the intent of harming him or her, either with
your bare hands or with any kind of object or weapon? In other words,
have you ever been in a physical fight for the purposes of harming
someone else?
15. Smoked (even just one puff), bought, or tried to buy cigarettes before
you were 18?
16. Trespassed or broken into a building for fun or to look around?
17. Lied to your parents about where you were, who you were with, or
how much money you spent on something?
18. Carried an illegal or concealed weapon, like a gun, knife, or club?
19. Shoplifted something such as makeup products, clothing, office
supplies, food, or electronics?
20. Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything else?

27 (51%)

23 (51%)

20 (47%)

18 (34%)

12 (27%)

9 (21%)

4 (8%)

3 (7%)

3 (7%)

14 (26%)
16 (30%)

12 (27%)
8 (18%)

9 (21%)
5 (12%)

16 (30%)

5 (11%)

3 (7%)

17 (32%)
46 (87%)

10 (22%)
36 (80%)

7 (16%)
25 (58%)

6 (11%)
18 (34%)

5 (11%)
7 (16%)

2 (5%)
9 (21%)

38 (72%)

32 (71%)

15 (35%)

Note. Participants responded “yes” (coded as 1) or “no” (coded as 0) aloud to an RA for each interview question. The
questions were adapted from Madon and colleagues (2012, 2013) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Youth
Risk Behavior Surveillance System (2014). Coded responses were summed to create total admission and denial scores for
each participant.
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Assessment and removal of outliers. The primary dependent and independent
variables of interest were inspected for extreme outliers (i.e., values more than three
standard deviations above the mean). Preliminary analyses did not reveal any extreme
outliers for the primary dependent measure (number of admissions). Several independent
variables (i.e., self-reported impulsivity [the BIS-11], behavioral impulsivity [the circle
tracing task], future orientation, sensation seeking, and age) contained extreme outliers.
These participants will be excluded from all analyses conducted in which these
independent variables are included.
Counterbalancing. The presentation of the CUB interview questions and future
orientation, impulse control, and sensation seeking measures were counterbalanced. That
is, some participants were randomly assigned to complete the future orientation, impulse
control, and sensation seeking measures before the CUB interview and others completed
them after the CUB interview. This was done in order to ensure the order of presentation
did not affect other relevant measure of interest. A series of Independent t-tests were
conducted to examine the influence of order on the number of admissions provided to the
CUB interview, future orientation scores, self-reported impulse control, behavioral
impulse control, sensation seeking, and CMR-R-II and FRI scores. Order of presentation
did not affect scores on any of these measures, all ps > .14. Thus the order in which
study measures were administered was not considered further.
Gender. To determine whether gender needed to be included as a control in all
analyses, a series of Independent t-tests were conducted to examine the influence of
gender on the primary dependent measure of interest (i.e., the number of admissions to
the CUB interview), impulse control, future orientation, sensation seeking, Miranda
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comprehension, and perceived aversiveness of the repetitive questions and the meeting
with a police officer. Only one statistically significant difference emerged. Males (M =
2.64, SD = 1.59) indicated that they were more tempted than females (M = 2.10, SD =
1.19) to provide a particular answer in response to the CUB interview questions in order
to avoid answering the repetitive questions, t(139) = 2.29, p = .02, 95% CI [0.73, 1.01], d
= 0.38. All other comparisons were nonsignificant, all ps > .07. Thus gender was not
considered further.
Perceived aversiveness of the repetitive questions (proximal consequence).
To examine participants’ perceptions of the aversiveness of answering the repetitive
questions, all participants were asked to provide Likert-type ratings of the questions. Of
the 205 individuals who participated in the study, 141 participant responses were used in
the subsequent analyses (due to suspicion and missing data points). A 3 (Age Group:
older adult vs. young adult vs. adolescent) X 2 (Consequences: PCD-DCA vs. PCADCD) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted on (1) the five-item
question aversion scale, (2) how much participants would have liked to skip the
additional questions, (3) how tempted participants were to give a particular answer to the
CUB survey to avoid the additional questions, and (4) how glad participants were when
the additional questions were finished. There was a statistically significant age group
difference on the combined dependent variables F(8, 264) = 2.20, p = .03, Wilks’
Lambda = .88, hp2 = .06. When the results for the dependent variables were considered
separately, only two differences reached statistical significance: the desire to skip the
additional questions, F(2, 135) = 2.16, p < .01, hp2 = .09, and being tempted to give a
particular answer to avoid answering the additional questions, F(2, 135) = 5.02, p < .01,
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hp2 = .07. Post hoc comparisons showed that young adults (M = 4.19) were more likely
than older adults (M = 3.71) and adolescents (M = 3.36) to want to skip the additional
questions. Furthermore, young adults (M = 2.78) were more likely than adolescents (M =
1.90) to indicate that they were tempted to give a particular answer to avoid answering
the additional questions. There were no other main effects or interactions. See Table 4
for mean and standard deviations and Table 5 for inferential statistics.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted separately to examine whether perceived
question aversiveness varied by Consequences condition. No significant differences
emerged for any of the items (i.e., question aversion scale, desire to skip questions,
tempted to change answers to avoid questions, feeling glad when done answering
questions) used to assess aversion to the questions, all ps > .09.
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Question Aversion Responses as a Function of Age
Group and Consequences Condition.
Question Aversion
Item

PCD-DCA
Condition
Mean
SD

PCA-DCD
Condition
Mean
SD

Older Adults

3.91

1.27

3.47

1.25

Young Adult
Adolescent

4.43
3.26

0.87
1.18

3.96
3.45

1.04
0.83

Older Adults

2.64

1.53

1.90

1.30

Young Adults

3.14

1.46

2.42

1.25

Adolescents

1.65

1.07

2.15

1.18

Older Adults

4.55

0.86

4.03

1.07

Young Adults
Adolescents

4.38
4.17

0.92
0.98

4.33
3.85

0.87
0.99

Older Adults

3.89

0.60

3.47

0.99

Young Adults
Adolescents

3.94
3.57

0.87
0.72

3.82
3.48

0.72
0.72

Irritatinga

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.55
3.81
3.57

0.96
0.75
0.95

3.27
3.71
3.15

1.08
0.91
0.88

Repetitivea

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

4.73
4.33
4.30

0.55
1.07
1.02

3.87
4.33
4.65

1.57
1.05
0.59

Boringa

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.77
3.90
3.30

1.07
1.18
1.30

3.33
3.71
3.35

1.37
1.16
1.04

Unpleasanta

Older Adults
Young Adults

3.55
3.62

0.86
1.12

3.33
3.38

1.09
1.06

Like to skip additional
questions

Tempted to give
particular answer

Glad questions were
finished

Question Aversion
Scale

Age Group
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Annoyinga

Adolescents

3.17

0.83

3.00

0.92

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.86
4.05
3.48

0.89
1.07
1.04

3.53
3.96
3.25

1.04
0.69
1.07

Note. a denotes items included in the Question Aversion Scale.

Table 5
F Values, p Values, and Effect Sizes for Question Aversion Responses.
Dependent Variables
F

p

hp 2

Age Group

2.20

.03*

.06

Consequence Condition

1.01

.41

.03

Age Group x Consequence Condition

1.39

.20

.04

Note. * Denotes a significant effect at p < .05.

Perceived aversiveness of the meeting with a police officer (distal
consequence). To examine participants’ perceptions of the aversiveness of meeting with
a police officer in a few weeks, all participants were asked to provide Likert-type ratings
of several questions. In line with the question aversiveness analyses, 141 participant
responses were used in the subsequent analyses (due to suspicion and missing data
points). A 3 (Age Group: older adult vs. young adult vs. adolescent) X 2 (Consequences:
PCD-DCA vs. PCA-DCD) MANOVA was conducted on (1) the five-item police
aversion scale and (2) how much participants’ hoped they would not have to meet with
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the police officer in a few weeks to discuss their responses to the CUB interview. There
was a statistically significant interaction on the combined dependent variables F(4, 266)
= 2.94, p = .02, Wilks’ Lambda = .92, hp2 = .04. When the results for the dependent
variables were considered separately, the interaction reached statistical significance for
both dependent variables.
Simple effects analyses were conducted separately for each dependent variable.
These analyses revealed that police aversion ratings were similar for older (MPCD-DCA =
2.65; MPCA-DCD = 2.81) and young adults (MPCD-DCA = 2.70; MPCA-DCD = 2.83) regardless
of the consequences associated with their CUB interview responses. However,
adolescents experienced greater self-reported aversion to the police when proximal
consequences (i.e., answering a set of 32 repetitive questions, MPCD-DCA = 3.24) were
associated with denials and distal consequences (i.e., meeting with a police officer in a
few weeks) were associated with admissions than when proximal consequences were
associated with admissions and distal consequences were associated with denials (MPCADCD

= 2.53)
Simple effects analyses were also conducted regarding how much participants’

hoped they would not have to meet with the police officer in a few weeks to discuss their
responses to the CUB interview. Young adults provided similar ratings regardless of the
consequences associated with their CUB interview responses (MPCD-DCA = 3.60; MPCA-DCD
= 3.46). However, older adults experienced less self-reported aversion to the meeting
with police when proximal consequences were associated with denials and distal
consequences were associated with admissions (MPCD-DCA = 3.09) than when proximal
consequences were associated with admissions and distal consequences were associated
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with denials (MPCA-DCD = 3.81). In contrast, adolescents experienced greater aversion to
the meeting with police when proximal consequences were associated with denials and
distal consequence were associated with admissions (MPCD-DCA = 3.57) than when
proximal consequences were associated with admissions and distal consequences were
associated with denials (MPCA-DCD = 2.80). Thus, it appears older adults were more
averse to the possibility of speaking with the police about criminal and unethical
behaviors they had not engaged in, whereas adolescents were more concerned about
meeting with the police to discuss behaviors in which they had engaged. See Table 6 for
mean and standard deviations and Table 7 for inferential statistics.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted separately to examine whether the perceived
aversiveness of the meeting with a police officer varied by consequences condition. No
significant differences emerged for any of the items (i.e., police averse scale and the hope
that one would not have to meet with the police) used to assess aversion to the questions,
all ps > .39.

68

Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Police Aversion Responses as a Function of Age
Group and Consequences Condition.
PCD-DCA
Condition
Mean
SD

PCA-DCD
Condition
Mean
SD

Older Adults

3.09

1.44

3.81

1.25

Young Adult
Adolescent

3.60
3.57

1.14
1.16

3.46
2.80

1.32
0.95

Police Aversion Scale

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

2.65
2.70
3.24

0.82
0.97
0.96

2.77
2.83
2.53

1.00
0.90
0.64

Nervousa

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

1.91
2.10
2.78

1.27
1.12
1.59

2.03
2.21
2.05

1.54
1.32
1.10

Reluctanta

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.14
3.05
3.48

0.89
1.15
1.08

3.23
3.04
2.70

1.22
1.08
1.03

Unenthuseda

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.27
2.95
3.74

1.03
1.10
0.96

3.37
3.38
2.80

1.10
1.17
0.77

Concerneda

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

1.73
2.30
2.61

1.12
1.38
1.62

1.67
2.00
2.15

1.18
1.18
0.93

Not looking forward toa

Older Adults
Young Adults
Adolescents

3.18
3.10
3.61

1.05
1.17
1.03

3.57
3.50
2.95

1.36
1.10
0.89

Police Aversion Item

Hope won’t have to
meet with police

Age Group

Note. a denotes items included in the Police Aversion Scale.
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Table 7
F Values, p Values, and Effect Sizes for Police Aversion Responses as a Function of Age
Group and Consequences Condition.
Dependent Variables
F

p

hp 2

Age Group

1.31

.27

.02

Consequences Condition

0.43

.65

.01

Age Group x Consequences Condition

2.94

.02*

.04

Note. * Denotes a significant effect at p < .05.

Suspicion check. I examined participants’ written and oral responses to the
suspicion check questions to identify participants who doubted the veracity of the
meeting with the police officer. I also examined participants’ written responses regarding
the purpose of or prior knowledge about the study to identify participants who appeared
to determine the true purpose of the study. Overall, 42 participants (16 older adults, 24
young adults, and 2 adolescents) were identified and excluded from the primary analyses.
Of these participants, 16 (8 older adults, 8 young adults) were excluded because they
expressed strong suspicion about the police (i.e., doubt about the veracity of the
collaboration with or veracity of the meeting with police) and 13 participants (4 older
adults, 9 young adults) because they made mention of “the police” in response to the
suspicion check question. An additional 11 participants (4 older adults, 7 young adults)
were excluded because they were suspicious of or figured out the true purpose of the
study. Despite expressly instructing parents not to share the true purpose of the study or
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the parental consent form with their child prior to his/her participation, one adolescent
participant disclosed having read the parental consent form (which contained the true
purpose of the study) prior to participating, and, thus, was excluded from the primary
analyses. Finally, one adolescent participant was excluded because s/he was unable to
complete the main study measure during the allotted study appointment. Procedures
were in place to deal with participants who became unduly stressed during the study
(Appendix R). However, no participants had to be excluded from analyses for this
reason.
Consequences condition manipulation check. Frequency analyses were
conducted to assess participants’ understanding of the consequence condition to which
they had been assigned. Twenty-two participants incorrectly identified their consequence
condition, one of whom was also identified as suspicious of the veracity of the meeting
with the police officer. Of these participants, twelve (including the individual who was
previously excluded for suspicion) said they did not answer any repetitive questions. By
design, all participants answered the repetitive questions at least once. This particular
subset of participants answered the repetitive questions an average of 11 times (including
the additional questions following the practice question; minimum = 4, maximum = 21).
Anecdotally, some participants were confused with the terminology of the question and
believed that the “additional questions” referenced something other than the repetitive
computer-based questions. Also, nine participants indicated that they had answered the
repetitive questions sometimes when giving a “yes” response and sometimes when giving
a “no” response. All participants only answered the additional questions for all yes or all
no responses. However, in order to ensure that all participants experienced answering the
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additional questions, a practice question was asked. The practice question was designed
to evoke the response that would require participants to answer the additional questions.
Participants who did not provide the desired response were led to believe that a computer
malfunction had occurred that required them to complete the additional questions even
though they had not given the response they were told led to answering the additional
questions. Only one of these nine participants did not give the desired response to the
practice question requiring the induction of the computer malfunction hoax. A final
participant indicated that s/he was in the opposite consequence condition than the one to
which s/he had been assigned. An investigation of the data indicated that this was not the
case. Even so, all participants (n = 22) who incorrectly identified their assigned
Consequences condition were excluded from analyses.
Testing for differences between participants who were and were not excluded
based on suspicion and a failed manipulation check. Thirty percent of the sample (n =
63) was excluded from analyses due to suspicion and/or failure to correctly report the
experimental consequences condition to which they had been assigned. The final sample
thus consisted of 142 participants. Analyses were conducted in an attempt to determine
whether there were differences in gender, age group, performance on the study measures,
and perceptions of the aversiveness of the questions and the meeting with a police officer
between individuals who were and were not excluded.
First, I examined participant gender and age group via chi square analyses.
Participants’ gender was unrelated to exclusion status, c2(1) = .07, p = .79, j = .02. A 2
(exclusion status) x 3 (age group) c2 test was conducted to test the equal distribution of
adolescents, young adults, and older adults across exclusion status. This analysis was
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statistically significant, c2(2) = 5.99, p = .05, j = .17. Overall, 31% of older adults, 39%
of young adults, and 19% of adolescents were excluded. Second, I used a series of t-tests
to examine possible differences based on exclusion status in the number of admissions
provided, scores on impulse control, future orientation, sensation seeking, and Miranda
comprehension measures, and ratings of perceived aversiveness of the questions and
meeting with a police officer. Significant differences only emerged for the question
averse scale, t(190) = 3.07, p = .002, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.15], d = 0.52, and the other three
question averse items regarding the desire to skip the repetitive questions, t(190) = 2.49,
p = .01, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.10], d = 0.41, the temptation to give a particular response to
avoid answering the repetitive questions, t(190) = 2.21, p = .03, 95% CI [-0.93, -0.05], d
= 0.36, and being glad when the repetitive questions were done, t(190) = 2.33, p = .02,
95% CI [-0.66, -0.05], d = 0.39. Examination of the means indicated that, as compared to
those who were included in analyses, individuals who were excluded were more averse to
the questions (Mexcluded = 4.11, SDexcluded = 0.78 vs. Mincluded = 3.70, SDincluded = 0.81),
possessed a greater desire to skip the repetitive questions (Mexcluded = 4.20, SDexcluded =
1.07 vs. Mincluded = 3.74, SDincluded = 1.15), were more tempted to give a particular answer
to avoid answering the repetitive questions (Mexcluded = 2.78, SDexcluded = 1.33 vs. Mincluded
= 2.29, SDincluded = 1.36), and were happier when the questions were done (Mexcluded =
4.58, SDexcluded = 0.81 vs. Mincluded = 4.23, SDincluded = 0.96). All other comparisons were
non-significant, all ps > .18.
Primary Analyses
The influence of consequences condition and age on admission decisions. To
test the hypothesis that youth would provide more admissions than adults when denials
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were associated with proximal consequences, a 3 (Age group: older adult vs. young adult
vs. adolescents) X 2 (Consequences condition: PCD-DCA vs. PCA-DCD) ANOVA was
conducted. The sum of the number of admissions participants made in response to the
CUB interview served as the dependent variable and consequences condition and age
group served as the independent variables. There was no significant interaction between
age group and consequences condition, F(2, 135) = .68, p = .51, h2 = 0.08 (see Figure 3).
However, main effects of age group and consequences condition emerged.
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Figure 3. Mean Admissions as a Function of Consequences Condition and Age Group.

Main effects analysis showed that significantly more admissions were provided
when denials were punished (M = 8.89) than when admissions (M = 5.97) were punished,
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F(1, 135) = 18.54, p < .001, h2 = 0.11 (Figure 4). There was also a significant main
effect of age group on the number of admissions provided, F(2, 135) = 9.89, p < .001, h2
= 0.11 (Figure 5). Examination of the means showed that the admissions rate was similar
for older adults (M = 9.19) and young adults (M = 7.58), p = .23, 95% CI [-0.58, 3.26],
and for young adults and adolescents (M = 5.51), p = .07, 95% CI [-0.11, 3.93].
However, older adults provided significantly more admissions than adolescents, p < .001,
95% CI [1.30, 5.19].
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Figure 4. Main Effect of Consequences Condition. Values indicate the admissions rate
of participants in each consequence condition. The proximal consequence of answering
the additional questions resulted in more admissions than the distal consequence of
meeting with a police officer involved in the study in a few weeks. Note. * Denotes a
significant difference at p < .001.
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Figure 5. Main Effect of Age Group. Values indicate the admissions rate of participants
in each age group. Older adults provided more admissions during the CUB interview
than adolescents. Differences between all other age group comparisons were not
statistically significant. Note. * Denotes a significant difference at p < .001.

Four linear regression analyses tested the influence of self-reported impulse
control, behavioral impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking on the
number of admissions provided during the CUB interview. Specifically, the number of
admissions given was regressed on four primary outcome variables: (a) self-reported
impulse control scores on the BIS-11, (b) the time taken (in seconds) to complete the
circle tracing task (i.e., the measure of behavioral impulsivity, (c) self-reported future
orientation, and (d) sensation seeking scores. To control for prior involvement in and/or
knowledge of the legal system, self-reported legal involvement (0 = never had prior
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justice system involvement, 1 = ever had justice system involvement) and Miranda
comprehension scores were entered in the first step of the model. The continuous age
variable, consequence condition, impulse control, future orientation, or sensation seeking
score, and all two- and three-way interactions were entered into the second step of the
model.
The influence of consequences condition, age, and self-reported impulse
control on admission decisions. Contrary to hypotheses, linear regression analyses
revealed that neither age, consequences condition, self-reported impulse control, or any
of the two- or three-way interactions were associated with admission decisions (Table 8).

Table 8
The Influence of Age, Consequences Condition, and Self-Reported Impulse Control on
Total Admission Decisions
Predictor
B (SE)
b
95% CI
p
Step 1
Legal system involvement
1.21 (.89)
.11
-0.55 – 2.97
.18
FRI score*
0.30 (.14)
.16
0.02 – 0.58
.04
CMR-R-II score
0.25 (.20)
.10
-0.15 – 0.65
.22
Step 2a
Age
-0.25 (.64)
-.34
-1.51 – 1.02
.70
Consequences condition
-5.15 (18.15)
-.58
-41.09 – 30.78
.78
Self-reported impulse
-0.01 (.25)
-.02
-0.50 – 0.48
.96
control
Age x Consequences condition
.39 (.78)
1.09
-1.15 – 1.93
.61
Age x Self-reported impulse
.01 (.01)
.74
-0.01 – 0.03
.46
control
Consequences condition x Self.07 (.31)
.44
-0.54 – 0.67
.83
reported impulse control
Age x Consequences condition
-.002 (.002)
-.37
-0.03 – 0.02
.20
x Self-reported impulse control
Note. Higher scores are indicative of more admissions provided during the CUB
interview.
a 2
R = .31 for Step 2. * p < .05.
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The influence of consequences condition, age, and behavioral impulse control
on admission decisions. Consistent with hypotheses, linear regression analyses revealed
that age was associated with admission decisions (Table 9). Specifically, for each
additional year of age, there was a .38 increase in the number of admissions provided
during the CUB interview. However, contrary to hypotheses, neither consequences
condition or behavioral impulsivity nor the two- or three-way interactions significantly
predicted the number of admissions provided.

Table 9
The Influence of Age, Consequences Condition, and Behavioral Impulse Control on Total
Admission Decisions
Predictor
B (SE)
b
95% CI
p
Step 1
Legal system involvement
1.32 (.92)
.13
-0.49 – 3.14
.15
FRI score*
0.31 (.16)
.16
0.00 – 0.62
.05
CMR-R-II score
0.13 (.21)
.05
-0.29 – 0.55
.54
a
Step 2
Age*
0.38 (.17)
.53
0.04 – 0.72
.03
Consequences condition
3.25 (5.10)
.38
-6.85 – 13.36
.53
Behavioral impulse control
0.03 (.03)
.42
-0.04 – 0.09
.39
Age x Consequences condition
-0.33 (.21)
-.91
-0.75 – 0.09
.13
Age x Behavioral impulse
-.002 (.001)
-.54
-0.01 – 0. 001
.24
control
Consequences condition x
-0.04 (.04)
-.70
-0.12 – 0.04
.31
Behavioral impulse control
Age x Consequences condition
.003 (.002)
.93
0.00 – 0.002
.15
x Behavioral impulse control
Note. Higher scores are indicative of more admissions provided during the CUB
interview.
a 2
R = .26 for Step 2. * p £ .05.
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The influence of consequences condition, age, and future orientation on
admission decisions. Again, contrary to hypotheses, linear regression analyses revealed
that neither age, consequences condition, future orientation, or any of the two- or threeway interactions were associated with the number of admissions provided during the
CUB interview (Table 10).

Table 10
The Influence of Age, Consequences Condition, and Future Orientation on Total
Admission Decisions
Predictor
B (SE)
b
95% CI
Step 1
Legal system involvement
1.44 (.88)
.13
-0.31 – 3.18
FRI score
0.26 (.15)
.14
-0.04 – 0.56
CMR-R-II score
0.25 (.21)
.10
-0.16 – 0.65
a
Step 2
Age
0.71 (.86)
1.00
-0.99 – 2.41
Consequences condition
20.79 (28.10)
2.34
-34.82 – 76.40
Future orientation
4.66 (6.41)
.27
-8.01 – 17.34
Age x Consequences condition
-0.77 (1.23)
-2.11
-3.21 – 1.67
Age x Future orientation
-0.17 (.30)
-0.73
-0.76 – 0.42
Consequences condition x
-7.45 (9.61)
-2.50 -26.46 – 11.56
Future orientation
Age x Consequences condition
.23 (.42)
1.91
-0.61 – 1.07
x Future orientation
Note. Higher scores are indicative of more admissions provided during the CUB
interview.
a 2
R = .26 for Step 2.
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p
.12
.09
.23
.41
.46
.47
.53
.57
.44
.58

The influence of consequences condition, age, and sensation seeking on
admission decisions. A final linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the
influence of age, consequences condition, and sensation seeking on admission decisions.
Analyses revealed that neither age, consequences condition, self-reported sensation
seeking, nor the two- or three-way interactions were significant predictors of admission
decisions during the CUB interview (Table 11).

Table 11
The Influence of Age, Consequences Condition, and Sensation Seeking on Total
Admission Decisions
Predictor
B (SE)
b
95% CI
Step 1
Legal system involvement
0.90 (.85)
.08
0.44 – 3.90
FRI score*
0.30 (.14)
.16
0.03 – 0.64
CMR-R-II score
0.22 (.20)
.09
-0.07 – 0.78
a
Step 2
Age
-0.24 (.34)
-.33
0.05 – 0.36
Consequences condition
1.96 (9.34)
.22
-7.53 – 0.31
Sensation seeking
-3.04 (2.84)
-.46
-0.24 – 2.58
Age x Consequences condition
-0.13 (.41)
-.37
Age x Sensation seeking
0.23 (.14)
.93
Consequences condition x
-0.62 (3.55)
-.20
Sensation seeking
Age x Consequences condition
-0.01 (.17)
-.08
-0.06 – 0.08
x Sensation seeking
Note. Higher scores are indicative of more admissions provided during the CUB
interview.
a 2
R = .32 for Step 2. * p < .05.
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p
.29
.03
.26
.48
.84
.29
.75
.11
.86
.95

Proposed mediation analyses. Recall that a key objective of the current study
was to examine why adolescents are more prone to providing false information during
police questioning than adults. Furthermore, it was expected that, due to increased
sensation seeking and deficits in impulse control and future orientation, adolescents
would be even more likely than adults to provide false information when denials were
associated with taxing proximal consequences. Because a significant interaction between
age group and consequences condition did not emerge, mediation analyses to determine
whether certain characteristics of adolescence (i.e., impulse control, future orientation,
and sensation seeking) accounted for this relationship were not warranted.
Exploratory Analyses
In light of results from the primary analyses showing that the data did not support
the study hypotheses, further analyses were conducted to examine 1) whether the
consequences conditions were equivalent and 2) whether the predicted age group
differences emerged for impulse control, future orientation, and sensation seeking scores.
Consequences condition. A series of Independent t-tests were conducted to
examine whether the two consequences conditions were equivalent in terms of the
number of admissions given, impulse control, future orientation, sensation seeking,
Miranda comprehension, and perceived aversiveness of the repetitive questions and the
meeting with a police officer. More admissions were provided when denials were
associated with proximal consequence (M = 8.86, SD = 4.80) than when admissions were
associated with the proximal consequence (M = 6.17, SD = 3.64), t(139) = 3.77, p < .001,
95% CI [1.28, 4.10], d = 0.63. All other comparisons were nonsignificant, all ps > .095.
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Impulse control. Both self-reported and behavioral impulse control was
assessed. Participants completed the BIS-11, a 30-item self-report measure, to assess
impulse control. Analyses revealed one case with a score three standard deviations above
the mean. This case was excluded from all subsequent analyses including BIS-11 scores.
A One-Way ANOVA was conducted on BIS-11 total scores and revealed no significant
differences in self-reported impulse control among the three age groups (Molder adult =
57.14, Myoung adult = 57.77, Madolescent = 58.24), F(2, 128) = .16, p = .85, h2 = 0.002.
Differences in behavioral impulse control were assessed using participants’ time
taken to trace a circle (measured in seconds). Analyses revealed thirteen cases in which
individuals’ times were three standard deviations above the mean time taken to complete
the task. These scores were excluded from all analyses including the behavioral impulse
control measure. A One-Way ANOVA conducted excluding the extreme outliers,
revealed significant differences in behavioral impulse control among the three age
groups, F(2, 128) = 4.03, p = .02, h2 = 0.06. Specifically, adolescents (M = 118 s) spent
significantly more time on the tracing task than older adults (M = 79 s), p = .02. There
were no differences in tracing time between older adults and young adults (M = 103 s), p
= .20, or between young adults and adolescents, p = .53. Thus, behavioral measures of
impulse control showed that, contrary to hypotheses, adolescents exuded greater restraint
than older adults.
Future orientation. Future orientation was assessed with a 15-item self-report
measure. Responses were assigned values ranging from 1 to 4. Mean scores were
created to represent individuals’ overall level of future orientation with higher scores
indicative of higher future orientation. Examination of future orientation scores revealed
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three individuals with scores more than three standard deviations below the mean. These
scores were excluded from all analyses involving future orientation scores.
It was predicted that adolescents would report lower future orientation than adults.
As expected, a One-way ANOVA revealed significant age differences in future
orientation scores, F(2, 135) = 3.32, p = .04, h2 = 0.05. However, in post hoc analyses no
significant differences emerged in the comparisons between any of the three age groups,
all ps > .05.
Sensation seeking. Differences in sensation seeking were assessed using
participant responses to three items on a self-report measure. Responses were assigned
values ranging from 1 to 4. Mean scores were calculated from these responses with
higher scores indicative of greater sensation seeking. Examination of sensation seeking
scores revealed no individuals with scores more than three standard deviations above or
below the mean.
I predicted that adolescents would report greater sensation seeking than adults. A
One-Way ANOVA was conducted to test this hypothesis. As expected, there were
differences between the three age groups, F(2, 136) = 7.10, p < .001, h2 = 0.09.
Specifically, adolescents (M = 2.76) reported greater levels of sensation seeking than
older adults (M = 2.29), p < .001. Young adults (M = 2.63) also reported greater levels of
sensation seeking than older adults, p = .03. There were no differences in self-reported
sensation seeking between young adults and adolescents, p = .60.
MRCI-II measures. In an attempt to explain why adolescents in the current study
were equally likely as adults to be susceptible to temporal discounting, exploratory
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analyses concerning the MRCI-II measures and self-administered CUB interview were
conducted.
CMR-R-II. A series of One-way ANOVAs was conducted to investigate possible
age group differences in the comprehension of the five Miranda warnings (e.g., the right
to silence, counsel, etc.) from the CMR-R-II measure. Results revealed significant age
group differences in the overall comprehension score, F(2, 138) = 4.52, p = .01, h2 =
0.06, with adolescents (M = 11.84) demonstrating significantly worse comprehension
scores than older adults (M = 12.87). All other age group comparisons were nonsignificant.
To specifically examine which concepts of their Miranda warnings youth
struggled to grasp, further exploratory analyses examined the five subtotal scores that are
used to compute a total CMR-R-II score. The subtotal scores pertain to the five elements
of the Miranda warning:
1. You have the right to remain silent. (Subtotal A)
2. Anything you say can be used against you in court. (Subtotal B)
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and to
have him or her with you during questioning. (Subtotal C)
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if
you wish. (Subtotal D)
5. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the
right to stop questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer. (Subtotal E)
These analyses revealed age group differences in only two of the five Miranda warnings.
Specifically, adolescents (M = 2.14; M = 1.86) demonstrated significantly worse
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comprehension of the two components of the Miranda warnings, compared to older
adults (M = 2.62; M = 2.28), concerning the right to a lawyer during questioning
(Subtotal C), F(2, 138) = 7.47, p = .001, h2 = 0.10, and to have a lawyer appointed even if
individuals cannot afford one (Subtotal D), F(2, 138) = 4.36, p = .02, h2 = 0.06
respectively. See Table 12 for means and standard deviations across age group.
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Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations for the CMR-R-II Subtotals and Total Score as a
Function of Age Group.
CMR-R-II Item

Subtotal A

Subtotal B

Subtotal C***

Subtotal D*

Subtotal E

CMR-R-II Total

Age Group
Mean

SD

Older Adults

2.45

0.70

Young Adults

2.40

0.62

Adolescents

2.19

0.79

Older Adults

2.60

0.66

Young Adults

2.64

0.57

Adolescents

2.84

0.37

Older Adults

2.62

0.56

Young Adults

2.36

0.65

Adolescents

2.14

0.64

Older Adults

2.28

0.69

Young Adults

2.18

0.78

Adolescents

1.86

0.68

Older Adults

2.91

0.30

Young Adults

2.76

0.48

Adolescents

2.81

0.39

Older Adults

12.87

1.55

Young Adults

12.33

1.91

Adolescents

11.84

1.57

Note. Higher scores are indicative of greater comprehension of Miranda rights.
* p < .05. *** p < .001.
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FRI. The second Miranda rights measure administered (i.e., the FRI), assessed
participants’ ability to appreciate and apply their rights during various legal proceedings
(i.e., during interrogation, during conferral with counsel, and in court). Analyses
revealed only a marginally significant difference based on age group for the FRI overall
score, F(2, 138) = 2.76, p = .07, h2 = 0.04. Post hoc analyses indicated that young adults
(M = 25.29) had marginally lower FRI scores than older adults (M = 26.38). Further
analyses of the three subscales making up the measure revealed significant differences in
participants’ understanding of the nature of interrogation, F(2, 138) = 5.39, p < .01, h2 =
0.07. Specifically, adolescents (M = 9.35) demonstrated better understanding than young
adults for items designed to assess individuals understanding of the nature of
interrogation (M = 8.47), p < .01. Significant age differences also emerged for the
subscale intended to assess the understanding of the right to silence in interrogation and
in court, F(2, 138) = 10.29, p = .04, h2 = 0.04. However, post hoc analyses revealed only
marginally significant differences between older adults (M = 8.00) and adolescents (M =
7.16), p = .06. This suggests there was inadequate power to detect differences for this
subscale. All other subscales and comparisons revealed non-significant differences. See
Table 13 for means and standard deviations by age group for the FRI.
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Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for the FRI Subscales and Total Score as a Function of
Age Group.
FRI Item

Nature of Interrogation

Right to Counsel

Right to Silence

FRI Total

Age Group
Mean

SD

Older Adults

8.96

1.22

Young Adultsa

8.47

1.63

Adolescentsa

9.35

0.78

Older Adults

9.42

0.95

Young Adults

9.56

0.87

Adolescents

9.53

0.88

Older Adultsb

8.00

1.56

Young Adults

7.27

2.01

Adolescentsb

7.16

1.83

Older Adults

26.38

2.33

Young Adults

25.29

2.65

Adolescents

26.05

1.89

Note. Higher scores are indicative of greater comprehension of Miranda rights.
a
Denotes a significant difference between age groups at p < .05. b Denotes a marginally
significant difference between age groups at p = .06.
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Self-Administered CUB. The repetitive question paradigm assumes that the
increased admissions given as a result of the influence of temporal discounting (i.e., when
denials are associated with proximal consequences) are false. In an attempt to determine
ground truth of individuals’ actual engagement in the criminal and unethical behaviors in
question, participants completed the CUB interview a second time after being debriefed
of the true purposes of the study. It is possible that differences based on age group and
temporal discounting in the number of admissions given to the CUB interview questions
was masked in the current study. Because adults have had more life experiences, it is
possible that they provided more truthful, and less false, admissions than adolescents. In
contrast, adolescents have had less life experience, thus most or all of their responses may
have been false. However, the number of false admissions made by adolescents may still
have failed to exceed the number of truthful admissions provided by adults. The number
of admissions provided during the face-to-face CUB interview were subtracted from the
number of admissions provided on the self-administered CUB interview. The resulting
score was indicative of the number of false admissions participants provided during the
face-to-face interview.
A 3 (Age group: older adult vs. young adult vs. adolescents) X 2 (Consequences:
PCD-DCA vs. PCA-DCD) ANOVA was conducted to examine the influence of age
group and temporal discounting on the number of false admissions provided during the
face-to-face CUB interview. Results revealed no significant interaction between age
group and consequences condition, F(2, 121) = .15, p = .86, h2 = 0.003. There were also
no differences between the three age groups, F(2, 121) = 1.24, p = .29, h2 = 0.02.
However, a main effect of consequences condition emerged, F(1, 121) = 10.21, p = .002,
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h2 = 0.08. Contrary to hypotheses, temporal discounting did not appear to influence the
number of false admissions provided in the expected direction. That is, fewer false
admissions were provided when denials were associated with proximal consequences (M
= 0.53, SD = 0.87) rather than when admissions were associated with proximal
consequences (M = 1.34, SD = 1.79). This indicates participants’ admissions were
influenced to a greater degree by the future meeting with a police officer than with the
repetitive questions.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current study was to examine the influence of temporal
discounting and other developmental factors (i.e., impulse control, future orientation, and
sensation seeking) possibly underlying youths’ increased proclivity to provide false
information during police questioning. The overarching goal was to contribute to
research that could provide empirically based recommendations for the reform of
interrogation procedures with young suspects.
Consistent with extant research, study findings showed that more admissions were
provided when denials, rather than admissions, were associated with unpleasant proximal
consequences, thereby supporting general hypotheses regarding temporal discounting.
However, contrary to hypotheses, youth were no more likely to provide admissions than
adults. That is, youths’ admissions decisions were not influenced more by temporal
discounting than adults – youth did not provide more admissions than adults when
denials were associated with proximal consequences. Rather admission decisions were
similar across all three age groups regardless of the consequences associated with denials.
This finding is, at least in part, inconsistent with prior research showing that adolescents
are more likely to provide false admissions in response to simulated police questioning
(see Pimentel et al., 2015; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Because the basic premise on
which the study was designed was not supported by the data, the conditions necessary for
determining whether the developmental characteristics of interest (i.e., impulse control,
future orientation, and sensation seeking) accounted for observed age group differences
were not met. Consequently, mediation analyses were not conducted.
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Several possible explanations exist as to why the data did not support the current
study hypotheses. Although, as predicted, adolescents reported greater sensation seeking
than older adults, youth and adults were comparable in terms of impulse control and
future orientation. In this study, impulse control was assessed via self-report with the
BIS-11 and behaviorally with the circle tracing task. Both of these measures provided
mixed findings regarding differences in impulse control between adolescents and adults.
The BIS-11 revealed no significant differences among any of the three age groups in selfreported impulse control. In contrast, the circle tracing task showed that adolescents
actually had better impulse control than older adults. Given these mixed findings, it is
difficult to discern the role of impulse control in the current study.
The lack of age group differences in impulse control, particularly in the predicted
direction, may have been an artifact of the sample of youth recruited for the current
study. That is, perhaps there are inherent differences in impulse control between
delinquent and non-delinquent youth. Particular focus was not given to recruiting at-risk
or delinquent youth, a population known to experience deficits in impulse control (DeLisi
& Vaughn, 2007), for the current study. Had delinquent or at-risk youth made up all of
or a substantial portion of our sample of youth, it is possible that differences in impulse
control may have emerged.
An alternative explanation also exists. Research has shown that situational and
emotional factors influence whether factors characteristic of adolescent development are
sufficient to result in differences in decision making between adolescents and adults. It is
specifically in high stakes situations or when decisions must be made in the “heat of the
moment,” that adolescent performance falters compared to adults (Casey & Caudle,
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2013). In the absence of these conditions, adolescents can perform as well as, if not
better than, adults. Thus, real-world interrogations, which are, by design, psychologically
manipulative, stressful, and intimidating (see Kassin et al., 2010; Lassiter & Meissner,
2010; Leo, 2008, for reviews), may produce differences in adolescent decision making,
whereas the current study did not, possibly because the paradigm used was not designed
to be a highly stressful situation.
It is important to note that participants completed the behavioral measure of
impulse control while the RA was in the room. Thus, it is possible that adolescents, who
tend to be more obedient to authority than adults (Grisso et al., 2003), spent longer on the
behavioral measure – which resulted in greater impulse control – because adolescents had
more difficulty than adults disobeying RAs’ instructions to “take as much time as you
need to trace the circle as slowly as possible.” It is also possible that adults evinced lower
impulse control on the behavioral measure due to the seemingly immature nature of the
task. Anecdotally, numerous adults indicated during the debriefing that the circle tracing
task seemed strange and inquired as to its purpose. Thus, it is possible that adults did not
take the task as seriously as adolescents because it seemed irrelevant to the stated purpose
of the study and/or appeared juvenile in nature. Regardless, findings regarding impulse
control from the measures administered in the current study fail to provide clear evidence
regarding differences in impulse control amongst the three age groups tested here.
The tendency to think about the future was assessed with a 15-item self-report
measure. Consistent with past research, it was hypothesized that adolescents would
exhibit diminished abilities to consider future consequences compared to both groups of
adults. However, no statistically significant differences in degree of future orientation
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emerged between the three age groups studied. Surprisingly, adolescents in the current
study did not exhibit diminished capabilities to adequately consider future consequences,
at least according to this self-report measure, which has previously been used with both
adolescents and adults and was designed to reduce socially desirable responding
(Steinberg et al., 2009).
The composition of the adult and adolescent sample and the ways in which the
two were recruited could account for the lack of observed differences in future
orientation. That is, both adults and adolescents who are apt to consider the future, may
have been more likely to select to participate in the research study. Adult participants
sought to receive extra credit in their courses by taking part in the study. The drive to
engage in activities at one point in time that will benefit one’s final course grade several
weeks or even months in the future, seems to be indicative of considerable future
orientation. Furthermore, there may be something quite different about adults currently
attending college as compared to similar age adults in the community who are not
currently enrolled in or attending college that influences future orientation. For instance,
adults attending college are likely doing so in order to achieve a particular degree or
career in the future. Thus, these individuals must continually consider and plan how to
best reach and prepare for that goal with their college education. Although, a sample of
same age community adults likely also consider future goals and consequences, this
tendency may not be as encouraged and emphasized as with adults who are attending
college.
Similarly, adolescents sought to fulfill volunteer hour requirements mandated by
their respective middle or high schools. Anecdotally, in my conversations with several of
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these individuals, multiple youth indicated that they were participating in order to fulfill
their volunteering hours well in advance of the deadline. Additionally, many youth
reported they had participated in the study to get a sense of the university campus and/or
an idea of what they might like to major in at college in the future. These anecdotes
suggest that youth who participated in the study may have been driven to participate
because of careful consideration of their future life and educational goals. It is also
possible that merely having to come to a university campus to participate in the study
triggered thoughts about the future for youth.
Considering the impulse control and future orientation data in concert, findings
suggest that adolescents in the current study possibly possessed more mature cognitive
control and decision making capacities than youth in previous research and those
involved in the justice system. Of course the reverse could also be true. That is, it could
be that the adult participants in this study were exceptionally immature. Participants’
Miranda comprehension scores were examined to determine which possibility was most
likely. Youth in the current study performed more poorly than adults when completing
the measure designed to assess their ability to recognize the rights (i.e., CMR-R-II)
afforded to them in Miranda. Although mean scores on this measure were quite high for
all age groups (MOlder Adult = 12.87, MYoung Adult = 12.33, MAdolescents = 11.84 out of 15).
When tested on their ability to understand, appreciate, and apply Miranda rights in the
context of arrest, interrogation, and in court (i.e., the FRI measure of Miranda),
adolescents’ performance did not differ significantly from that of older and young adults.
Again, mean scores on this measure were quite high for all age groups (MOlder Adult =
26.38, MYoung Adult = 25.29, MAdolescents = 26.05 out of 30). These results suggest that
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cognitive and decision making capacities among youth in this study were similar to
adults. Moreover, results provide evidence to support the idea that adolescents in the
current study possessed advanced cognitive and decision making capacities, which may
be responsible, in part, for the lack of support for the hypothesized findings.
Mock interrogation paradigms have been developed (e.g., Kassin & Kiechel,
1996; Russano et al., 2005) to mimic real world interrogation processes and procedures in
the lab. These interrogation paradigms involve direct accusations of “guilt” and
incorporate various social pressures and psychological techniques designed to induce
participants to confess. Because the overarching research question for the current study
involved investigating the underlying processes of interrogation and the influence of
temporal discounting, I opted to use a paradigm that did not involve direct accusations of
guilt or social psychological pressures to elicit confessions. Instead, the study procedures
were modeled after previous research designed to investigate a key underlying principle
of interrogations – that denials are punished with continued questioning and admissions
are rewarded with questioning coming to an end (Madon et al., 2012; 2013).
Using a mock interrogation paradigm that did not include social pressures to
confess could account for the lack of evidence to support the hypothesized age group
differences. That is, social pressures may be the key component inducing youth to
provide false admissions. In the current study, youth reported greater perceived
aversiveness to the police than adults. If direct accusations and social pressures to
confess had come from police – or another real or perceived authority figure – it is
possible that youths’ ability to regulate impulse control and consider the future
consequences of their behavior would have been weakened or taxed. Thus, the inclusion
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of social pressures to confess may exacerbate cognitive deficits in adolescent decision
making in interrogation. Though youth in the current study had greater fear of the
meeting with a police officer than adults, that did not appear to be enough to influence
admission decisions.
It is also possible that adolescents took the study more seriously than adults,
resulting in adolescents overriding the desire to provide false admissions for fear that
they would get in trouble or ruin the integrity of the research. Adult participants likely
also had more demands on their time (e.g., jobs, other appointments, children),
incentivizing them to complete the study quickly, which may have resulted in the
provision of more false admissions to avoid answering the repetitive questions for
denials.
Furthermore, adult participants at the university are routinely required or
incentivized to participate in psychological research, and may view research
opportunities as an experience to quickly get through in order to obtain extra credit.
Anecdotal evidence suggests youths’ experiences were quite different. My first-hand
discussion with youths’ parents, revealed that most youth involved in the study were
participating in research for the first time. I had contact (via email and/or phone) with all
parents prior to their child’s participation in the study, and provided parents with
instructions for how to handle their child’s questions about what s/he would be doing in
the study. Upon discussion with parents during the in-person parental consent
procedures, several parents indicated that their child/children were nervous about
participating. Parents indicated that they attempted to assuage their child/children’s
nerves by telling him/her that the researchers would be nice to them. Furthermore,
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numerous parents specifically directed their child/children to be honest and truthful with
researchers during the study. Adult participants, at least to my awareness, were not given
the same admonition prior to study participation. Thus, it is possible that adolescents felt
extra pressure not to provide false admissions to escape the proximal consequences
associated with denials during the CUB interview. It is likely that this could be attributed
to youths’ fear of their parents being apprised of their study responses. However, it is
important to note that all members of the research team were instructed to inform
adolescent participants that their responses to any of the study measures would not be
shared with his/her parent(s) unless required by the university.
A final explanation exists. Specifically, it is likely that adults, due to greater life
experience, have actually engaged in more of the criminal and unethical behaviors in
question than adolescents. This possibility was considered when choosing the interview
questions to include for the current study. Interview questions were adapted from Madon
and colleagues (2012, 2013) research using this paradigm with undergraduate students.
Questions from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Youth Risk Behavior
Surveillance System (2014) were also included. Questions were adapted from both
sources in order to ensure that the final set of interview questions contained behaviors
both adolescents and adults had engaged in and to which they could provide truthful
admissions. Thus, the resulting set of interview questions was designed to be appropriate
for use with both adolescents and adults.
However, it could still be that adults truthfully responded to the interview
questions by admitting having engaged in, for example, eight of the behaviors in
question, only one or two of which were false admissions. In contrast, adolescents likely
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have engaged in less of the behaviors in question. During the interview, adolescents may
have truthfully admitted to engaging in one or two of the behaviors but provided three or
four false admissions. Thus, even though the mean admission rate is lower for
adolescents than adults, a more fine-grained analysis may reveal that adolescents
provided more false admissions than adults. Data were collected to assess this possible
explanation (the self-administered CUB post debriefing), and, while both adolescents and
adults provided false admissions, there were no differences between the three age groups
in the tendency to do so. However, these results should be interpreted with caution,
because it is impossible to determine ground truth of participants’ face-to-face and selfadministered CUB interview responses.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study represents an initial step in assessing the influence of temporal
discounting, impulse control, and future orientation on individuals’ potential willingness
to provide false admissions during questioning with police and other authority figures.
Several limitations are present which should be considered when evaluating the results of
the current study.
First, a key limitation of the current study, as with many experimental studies,
was the reliance on college students to form the young and older adult participant
samples. Similarly, many adolescent participants were recruited within the university
setting. That is, announcements were made to faculty in departments across campus and
to undergraduate psychology students soliciting the participating of their children,
siblings, and/or relatives. Neither college students nor youth from highly educated
families are representative of the population of individuals typically questioned by police
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as suspects of crime. In fact, research shows that individuals with low IQ and mental
illness are overrepresented among both adult and adolescent offenders (Lynam, Moffit &
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993; Redlich, 2007). Deficits in impulse control and the ability to
appropriately consider consequences are often identified as key deficits of mental illness
and intellectual impairment (e.g., individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder). Thus, while impulse control and future orientation did not differ based on age
group nor did they appear to influence the decision to provide false admissions among
participants in the current study, those deficits may play a role in high stakes, stressful
interrogations. However, because the current study did not include a sample of
representative justice involved adults and youth, the current study may have failed to
fully capture the influence of the factors of interest that influence decision making in
interrogation.
To account for these limitations, future research should recruit participants who
have been or are currently involved with the justice system to adequately examine the
possibility of the existence of the relationship between willingness to provide false
information and deficits in impulse control and consideration of future consequences.
Because this type of research may be difficult to conduct with actual offenders in prison
or in juvenile detention facilities, researchers could also consider recruiting non-criminal
adults and youth from the community known to have deficits in impulse control (e.g., the
mentally ill, youth and adults with ADHD), or those who are at-risk of being involved
with the justice system.
Second, the suspicion rate among participants in the present study (20% overall)
was higher than that observed in previous studies utilizing this paradigm. Specifically,

100

previous research has reported either no suspicion (Madon et al., 2012, 2013), a suspicion
rate of less than 1% (Madon et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2015), or a maximum suspicion rate
of approximately 3.5% (Madon et al., 2012). However, differences in suspicion rate may
be due to the criteria used to exclude participants for suspicion. The current study
utilized a liberal approach, excluding any participant who merely mentioned “the
police/police officer” (with or without elaboration indicating clear suspicion of the
veracity of the meeting with a police officer or police officer involvement in the study) in
response to suspicion check items (e.g., “Do you think you were misled in any way
during the study? [If yes] Can you explain to me how?”). It is possible that extant
research employed a more conservative criterion for suspicion exclusion decisions (e.g.,
excluding only those participants who explicitly stated they believed the police officer
was fake). Although, it should be noted that the suspicion rate observed in the current
study is comparable to that of related research utilizing a more ecologically valid mockinterrogation paradigm (see Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Pimentel et al., 2015).
Elevated suspicion could also be an artifact of the sample characteristics. That is,
racial and/or ethnic minorities tend to hold less favorable attitudes of the police (Taylor,
Turner, Esbensen, & Winfree, 2001). The mere mention of police involvement in a
university psychology study could have been enough to raise suspicion for the
participants involved in the current study. The majority of participants in the present
study (74%) identified as a racial/ethnic minority (i.e., Hispanic or African American).
Far fewer participants were racial and/or ethnic minorities in previous studies utilizing
this paradigm (~5% in Madon et al., 2012; ~10% in Madon et al., 2013; ~6% in Yang et
al., 2015). Regardless of the reason for elevated suspicion in the current study, the
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exclusion of a large portion of the sample was unexpected. The exclusion of these
participants likely lowered power in the analyses and the ability to detect differences
across all analyses.
Third, the interrogation paradigm used was chosen because it is designed to
closely mimic one of the underlying processes of interrogation, whereby denials are
punished with additional questions, accusations, and the inability to end the questioning
process, and admissions are rewarded with individuals being able to move forward with
the process. While this paradigm was particularly well-suited for the purpose and goals
of the current study, it also lacks several realistic elements of the interrogation process.
Ethical considerations make it impossible for real world interrogation practices to be fully
utilized in the laboratory. However, as previously discussed, multiple mock interrogation
paradigms have been developed for research purposes that incorporate some real world
tactics and procedures, albeit in limited capacity and for short duration (e.g., Pimentel et
al., 2015; Russano et al., 2005). For example, in more realistic laboratory mock
interrogation paradigms, interrogators accuse participants of violating a lab rule and
employ various interrogation techniques that have been used by real world interrogators
to attempt to induce the participant to truly or falsely confess to the act of wrongdoing.
Participants in the current study were merely asked yes/no questions about their
past involvement in criminal and unethical behaviors. The RAs asking these questions
neither specifically accused participants of engaging in those activities nor were
participants threatened with more severe consequences if they refused to admit having
engaged in the behaviors in question. Thus, several of the key social psychological
elements (e.g., developing rapport, pressure to obey authority, direct accusation of guilt,
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minimization techniques, the presentation of false evidence) of the typical interrogation
process were missing from this study. Pressure from the interrogator, direct accusations
of guilt, and minimization of the seriousness of the crime and/or the consequences
associated with confessing, play a key role in the process of providing false information
during questioning (see Kassin et al., 2010 for a review). It is likely that these social
psychological elements interact with the interpersonal developmental characteristics of
interest (e.g., impulse control and future orientation). Moreover, it may even be
necessary for social psychological elements and pressures to be present to exacerbate
differences between youth and adults in impulse control, future orientation, and the
tendency to more readily value immediate over future consequences and rewards. The
questioning process in the current study, in which participants answered a series of yes/no
questions in the absence of pressure and accusations of being deceptive, was not designed
to invoke stress or hurried decisions. Developmental research has shown that it is
specifically in situations in which adolescents must make rash decisions, that their
decision making capabilities tend to be inferior to adults (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard,
Graham, & Banich, 2009). In contrast, when the situation does not necessitate
adolescents make hasty decisions, their decision making is comparable to adults
(Steinberg et al., 2009). Future research should consider altering the questioning style
participants are subjected to in an attempt to more closely examine the influence and
interaction of situational and interpersonal factors on individuals’ decisions to provide
true and false admissions.
Finally, it is impossible to assess whether participants’ admissions and denials to
the CUB interview questions were in fact true or false. In an attempt to overcome this
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limitation, participants in the current study, after being informed of the true purpose of
the study, were asked to complete the CUB interview questions a second time. However,
this time, participants were aware that there were no consequences for their responses
(i.e., there were no additional questions to answer based or the possibility of meeting with
a police officer based on their responses), that there were no police officers actually
involved in the study, that their responses would be anonymous, and that only authorized
members of the research team would have access to their responses. Furthermore,
participants were informed of the importance of telling the truth on the survey and were
made to feel that it was normal for participants in their situation to previously have
admitted (or denied) engaging in behaviors s/he had not (had) actually engaged in during
the face-to-face interview, in order to avoid answering the additional questions.
In an attempt to establish ground truth, responses to the self-administered CUB
interview were examined. Findings revealed that youth and adults provided false
admissions during the face-to-face CUB interview, but there were no significant age
group differences in the tendency to do so. Although numerous attempts were made to
ensure that participants felt comfortable providing truthful responses on this second
administration of the interview, it is possible that participants remained reluctant to
disclose truthful responses. Anecdotally, several adult participants indicated that they did
not feel it would be in their best interest to disclose truthful information to researchers
about their engagement in criminal and unethical behaviors. Because it was not possible
to verify interview responses with individuals’ criminal records, the veracity of
participants’ interview responses cannot be determined.
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Implications and Conclusions
The United States Supreme Court has deemed custodial interrogation to be an
inherently coercive process (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). Interrogation is beneficial
because questioning often results in the elicitation of incriminating information from
guilty suspects (Drizin & Leo, 2004). However, interrogation can be problematic if and
when, due to the tactics used or characteristics of the suspect, false confessions are
elicited from innocent suspects. Concern has arisen over the increased number of cases
that have come to light in recent decades involving young suspects who have been
compelled to falsely confess during police questioning (Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006).
The current study sought to provide an in-depth examination of characteristics of the
interrogation situation (i.e., temporal discounting) and possible factors underlying youths’
increased susceptibility to provide false information in interrogation. This was the first
study to investigate this novel question experimentally in the laboratory (but see
Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Einarsson, & Validmarsdottir, 2004; Gudjonsson,
Sigurdsson, Einarsson, Bragason, & Newton, 2010 for an examination of some of these
factors in field research).
Study findings were intended to be particularly useful at the interface of
psychology and the law. This research was designed to advance scientific understanding
of the influence of the mechanisms underlying interrogation on the vulnerabilities of
youth and subsequent elicitation of both true and false information. This is a critical
question because (1) the criminal justice system relies heavily on eliciting presumably
truthful information, often in the form of confession, to solve crimes, and (2)
recommendations for interrogation reforms to safeguard youth (e.g., mandatory provision
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of a lawyer, special training for law enforcement personnel, electronic recording of
interrogation) have routinely been proffered without empirical support as to evidence of
the underlying mechanisms they have been designed to address.
The importance of a systematic investigation of the incidence and impact of the
vulnerability of youth in interrogation is twofold. This acquired understanding allows
researchers to propose developmentally appropriate reforms which can then be relayed to
practitioners for use when questioning young suspects. Study findings can be directly
translated into guidelines on questioning young suspects (e.g., providing young suspects
with breaks, imposing time limits when questioning young suspects) and have the
potential to directly impact countless real crime suspects, investigators, and justice
system officials. For example, interrogators may be encouraged to explicitly highlight
and explain to young suspects the immediate and future consequences of confessing. For
instance, in the short-term, a confession means that youth will no longer be interrogated
but that they may still have to remain in police custody. In the long term, providing a
confession may mean that youth could be charged with and possibly tried and convicted
for this crime. Furthermore, interrogators can estimate the amount of time youth can
expect to serve if convicted of committing a crime of this caliber. In court, jury
instructions could be given regarding the science of this recommended procedure and
how to differentially weigh confession evidence when the recommended procedures are
not followed with young suspects undergoing police questioning. Relatedly, findings can
be directly integrated into investigator trainings on how to best elicit truthful information
from young suspects.
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Unfortunately, the data did not support the study predictions. Contrary to
hypotheses and previous research, adolescents in the current study were less likely to
provide admissions, and thereby less influenced by temporal discounting, compared to
both older and young adults. Furthermore, adolescents did not show evidence of
expected developmental deficits in impulse control and future orientation. Regardless of
the reason, in order to determine the role of impulse control and future orientation on
admission decision, the age groups sampled must first differ on these characteristics.
Three main reasons could exist to explain why the study hypotheses were not
supported. First, the paradigm used does not employ – by design – key situational and
social psychological elements shown to elicit both true and false confessions. Future
research should examine the current study’s research questioning using a more
ecologically valid mock interrogation paradigm. Second, general measures of impulse
control, future orientation, and sensation seeking were administered. Perhaps more
specific measures designed precisely to capture impulse control, future orientation, and
sensation seeking in an interrogation context are needed. Finally, lack of support for
hypotheses may be due to the sample of adolescents who participated in the study. These
youth were not characteristic of young suspects who have been involved in or who are at
risk of being involved in the justice system.
The goal of future research should be to more thoroughly understand the problem
of false confession among young suspects. To provide the most beneficial insight to the
criminal justice system, this enhanced understanding can be used to develop empirically
based recommendations for the reform of interrogation to safeguard young suspects. In
order to achieve these goals, it is imperative that future research is conducted with youth
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who are representative of young suspects involved in the justice system in situations that
most closely mimic custodial interrogation. Specifically, the basic science concerning
interrogation needs to be extended to a sample of youth known to exhibit impulse control
and future orientation deficits, that is at risk of committing crime, being questioned by
police, and providing false information to police. While youth with these problems are
overrepresented among justice involved youth, there has been no known experimental
interrogation research with this population. Until or unless this research is conducted, the
research community will be unable to (1) provide the criminal justice system with an
informed evaluation of safeguards currently in place or (2) design and implement new
empirically derived and tested interrogation reforms for use with young suspects.
Without this research to inform interrogation reform, it is likely that some young suspects
will continue to provide false information and be wrongfully convicted for crimes they
did not commit.
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Appendix A
Contact Information Sheet
Contact Information Record

Department of PsychologyFLORIDA

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Part I. Participant Contact Information

1. Participant’s Name:
Last

First

2. Student ID #:
3. Email:
4. Cell Phone #:

Part II. Appointment Information

1. Date:
2. Time:
3. Location:
4. Officer:
5. Study Name:
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Appendix B
Criminal and Unethical Behaviors Interview Questions
(RA Administered)
Have you ever…
PQ: Faked a high school diploma?

□Yes □ No

1. Drank (even just one sip), bought, or tried to buy alcohol

□Yes □ No

before you were 21?
2. Tried, used, or experimented with any illegal drugs such as
marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other kind of drug
even just one time?

□Yes □ No

3. Cheated on an exam, paper, homework assignment, or
school project by taking credit for someone else’s work,
ideas, or answers as your own (plagiarism) or helped
another person cheat?

□Yes □ No

4. Used something that belonged to somebody else without
permission, such as something that belonged to a family
member, friend, roommate, or acquaintance?

□Yes □ No

5. Made a harassing, threatening, or prank phone call, text
message, or social media post or private message?

□Yes □ No

6. Failed to wear a seat belt?

□Yes

□ No

7. Knowingly kept something of value that you received in
error, such as extra change given to you by a cashier or extra
merchandise from a store or from an internet purchase?

□Yes

□ No

8. Vandalized property, like keying a car, slashing a tire,
spraying graffiti, or egging a house or car?

□Yes

□ No

9. Invaded another’s privacy such as by reading another’s
diary, text messages, or emails without permission?

□Yes

□ No

10. Jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie
theater, or grocery store?

□Yes

□ No

11. Purposefully not returned something that you borrowed like
a book, clothing, or money?

□Yes

□ No
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12. Engaged in a nonviolent sex offense such as exposing
yourself to someone by mooning or flashing them or
engaged in voyeurism, which is being a peeping Tom?

□Yes

□ No

13. Started or spread a rumor about someone?

□Yes

□ No

14. Assaulted someone with the intent of harming him or her,
either with your bare hands or with any kind of object or
weapon? In other words, have you ever been in a physical
fight for the purposes of harming someone else?

□Yes

□ No

15. Smoked (even just one puff), bought, or tried to buy
cigarettes before you were 18?

□Yes

□ No

16. Trespassed or broken into a building for fun or to look

□Yes

□ No

17. Lied to your parents about where you were, who you were
with, or how much money you spent on something?

□Yes

□ No

18. Carried an illegal or concealed weapon, like a gun, knife, or

□Yes

□ No

19. Shoplifted something such as makeup products, clothing,
office supplies, food, or electronics?

□Yes

□ No

20. Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything

□Yes

□ No

around?

club?

else?
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Appendix C
Police Officer Availability Schedule
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Appendix D
Police Flyers
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Appendix E
Repetitive Questions
Thinking about the average FLORIDIAN…
How invulnerable do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-important do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How gratified do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How resentful do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How doubtful do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How guilty do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the illegal
or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the age of
21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-righteous do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How jealous do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How disoriented do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How worthless do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-assured do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-conscious do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How happy-go-lucky do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How surprised do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How strong do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How hostile do you think the average FLORIDIAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

Thinking about the average AMERICAN…
How invulnerable do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-important do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How gratified do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How resentful do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How doubtful do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How guilty do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the illegal
or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the age of
21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-righteous do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How jealous do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How disoriented do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How worthless do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-assured do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How self-conscious do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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How happy-go-lucky do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in
the illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before
the age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How surprised do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How strong do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

How hostile do you think the average AMERICAN would be while engaging in the
illegal or unethical behavior (e.g., drinking, buying, or trying to buy alcohol before the
age of 21)?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely
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Appendix F
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
Directions: People differ in ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test
to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and put an
X on the appropriate box on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much time on
any statement. Answer quickly and honestly. You may only choose one answer option
for each question.

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Almost
Always/
Always
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Rarely/
Never
1. I plan tasks carefully.a
2. I do things without thinking.
3. I make-up my mind quickly.
4. I am happy-go-lucky.
5. I don’t “pay attention.”
6. I have “racing” thoughts.
7. I plan trips well ahead of time.a
8. I am self-controlled.a
9. I concentrate easily.a
10. I save regularly.a
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures.
12. I am a careful thinker.a
13. I plan for job security.a
14. I say things without thinking.
15. I like to think about complex
problems.a
16. I change jobs.
17. I act “on impulse.”
18. I get easily bored when solving
thought problems.
19. I act on the spur of the moment.
20. I am a steady thinker.a
21. I change residences.
22. I buy things on impulse.
23. I can only think about one thing at
a time.
24. I change hobbies.
25. I spend or charge more than I
earn.
26. I often have extraneous thoughts
when thinking

131

Occasionally Often

27. I am more interested in the
present than the future.
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures.
29. I like puzzles.a
30. I am future oriented.a
a
Item scored 4, 3, 2, 1.

□
□
□
□
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□

□

□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

Appendix G
Circle Tracing Task

**Make sure you have the stopwatch with you before you begin!**
1. Did you have the participant trace the circle as slowly as possible?
□Yes □ No
2. How long did it take the participant to trace the circle?
____________________________________________
(Legibly record the time displayed on the stopwatch)
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Appendix H
Future Orientation Questionnaire
Directions: Please choose which item in the pair of statements best describes you. Then rate whether that item only is
“Sort of true” or “Really true” for you. You may only choose one answer option for each question.
Really Sort of
Sort of Really
True
True
True
True
for Me for Me
for Me
for
Me
1.a
□
□
Some people like to plan
Other people like to jump
□
□
things out one step at a time
right into things without
BUT
planning them out
beforehand
2.
□
□
Some people spend very
Other people spend a lot
□
□
little time thinking about
of time thinking about
BUT
how things might be in the
how things might be in
future
the future
a
3.
□
□
Some people like to think
Other people don’t think
□
□
about all of the possible
it’s necessary to think
good and bad things that
BUT
about every little
can happen before making a
possibility before making
decision
a decision
a
4.
□
□
Some people usually think
Other people just act-they
□
□
about the consequences
BUT
don’t waste time thinking
before they do something
about the consequences
5.
□
□
Some people would rather
Other people will give up
□
□
be happy today than take
their happiness now so
BUT
their chances on what might
that they can get what
happen in the future
they want in the future
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6.a
7.
8.a

9.

10.

11.a

12.

Really
True
for Me

Sort of
True
for Me

□

□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□

□

□

□

Some people are always
making lists of things to do

BUT

Some people make
decisions and then act
without making a plan
Some people would rather
save their money for a rainy
day than spend it right
away on something fun

BUT

BUT

Some people have trouble
imagining how things
might play out over time

BUT

Some people don’t spend
much time worrying about
how their decisions will
affect others
Some people often think
what their life will be like
10 years from now

BUT

BUT

Some people think that
planning things out in
advance is a waste of time

BUT
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Other people find making
lists of things to do a
waste of time
Other people usually
make plans before going
ahead with their decisions
Other people would
rather spend their money
right away on something
fun than save it for a
rainy day
Other people are usually
pretty good at seeing in
advance how one thing
can lead to another
Other people think a lot
about how their decisions
will affect others
Other people don’t even
try to imagine what their
life will be like in 10
years
Other people think that
things work out better if
they are planned out in
advance

Sort of Really
True
True
for Me
for
Me
□
□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

13.

14.a
15.

Really
True
for Me

Sort of
True
for Me

□

□

□
□

□
□

Some people like to take
big projects and break them
down into small steps
before starting to work on
them
Some people take life one
day at a time without
worrying about the future
Some people think it’s
better to run through all the
possible outcomes of a
decision in your mind
before deciding what to do

BUT

BUT

BUT

Other people find that
breaking big projects
down into small steps
isn’t really necessary
Other people are always
thinking about what
tomorrow will bring
Other people think it’s
better to make up your
mind without worrying
about things you can’t
predict

Sort of Really
True
True
for Me
for
Me
□
□

□

□

□

□

Scoring: All items are scored left to right on a scale of 1-4. aReverse score items: 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, and 14, so that higher
scores indicate a stronger future orientation. Future Orientation total scores is the unweighted average of all 15 items.
Anticipation of Future Consequences is the unweighted averaged of items 3, 4, 9, 10, and 15.
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Appendix I
Sensation Seeking Questionnaire
Directions: Read each statement and put an X on the appropriate box on the right side of
this page. You may only choose one answer option for each question.

1. I often get in a jam because I do
things without thinking.

Strongly
Agree
□

Agree

Disagree

□

□

Strongly
Disagree
□

2. I think that planning takes the fun out
of things.

□

□

□

□

3. I have to use a lot of self-control to
keep out of trouble.

□

□

□

□

4. I enjoy taking risks.a

□

□

□

□

5. I enjoy new and exciting experiences,
even if they are a little frightening or
unusual.a

□

□

□

□

6. Life with no danger in it would be
too dull for me.a

□

□

□

□
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Appendix J
CMR-R-II
(Comprehension of Miranda Rights – Recognition – II)
All participants were instructed to respond to these statements by indicating whether the
three subsequent sentences meant the same thing as or something different as the original
sentence.
1. You have the right to remain silent.
a. It is not right to tell lies.
b. You should not say anything until the police ask you questions.
c. You do not have to say anything about what you did.
2. Anything you say can be used against you in court.
a. What you say might be used to prove you are guilty.
b. If you won’t talk to the police, then that will be used against you in court.
c. If you tell the police anything it can be repeated in court.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and to
have him or her with you during questioning.
a. You can talk to your social worker before anything happens.
b. A lawyer is coming to see you after the police are done with you.
c. You can have a lawyer now if you ask for one.
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if
you wish.
a. If you don’t have the money for a lawyer the court will appoint a social
worker to help you.
b. You can get legal help if you are poor.
c. The court will give you a lawyer free if you don’t have the money to pay
for one.
5. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the
right to stop questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
a. Even though you answered some of the police officer’s questions, you still
can ask for a lawyer at any time.
b. No matter when you ask for a lawyer, you will not get one until after the
police question you about the crime.
c. Even if you ask for a lawyer during questioning, you cannot speak with
the lawyer until the day you go to court.

138

Appendix K
FRI
(Function of Rights in Interrogation)
All participants were shown a picture of a particular situation. The participant was then
asked to respond to questions regarding what was going on in the picture.
Picture #1. Joe’s Interrogation: a suspect sitting at a table across from two police
officers.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What is it that the policemen will want Joe to do?
Finish this sentence. The police think that Joe _______________.
What is the most important thing the police might want Joe to tell them?
How are the policemen probably feeling?
How is Joe probably feeling?

Picture #2: Tim and His Lawyer: a suspect and a lawyer in consultation in a room.
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is the main job of the lawyer?
While he is with his lawyer, what is Tim supposed to do?
What is the main thing Tim’s lawyer will be talking to Tim about?
Imagine that Tim’s lawyer is saying, “I want you to tell me exactly what you did
and tell me the truth about what happened.” Then Tim tells him that he did the
crime. Why would Tim’s lawyer want to know that?

Picture #3: Greg’s Interrogation: a suspect in a room with two police officers.
1. Finish this sentence. If Greg decides to tell the police about what he did, then the
things Greg says _________________.
2. If Greg decides not to talk, what is the most important thing the police are
supposed to do?
3. If Greg says he doesn’t want to talk but the police tell him he has to talk, what
should happen then?
Picture #4: Greg’s Court Hearing: a courtroom hearing with a judge, police officers,
parents, the defendant’s lawyer, and the defendant.
1. If Greg’s lawyer did just what he is supposed to do here in court, how would Greg
be feeling?
2. If the judge finds out that Greg wouldn’t talk to the police, then what should
happen?
3. Greg did not tell the police anything about what he did. Here in court, if he were
told to talk about what he did that was wrong, will he have to talk about it?
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Appendix L
Demographics and Legal System Involvement (Q 3)
1. What is your age?

________________ Years

2. When is your birthday?

________________ (MM/DD/YYYY)

3. What is your gender?

Check one: _____Male ________ Female

4. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check
only one)
_____ African American

_____ Asian/Pacific Island

_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic

_____ Hispanic

_____ Native American

_____ Other __________________

5. What is the highest education level you have completed?
_____ 6th grade

_____ Freshman year in college

_____ 7th grade

_____ Sophomore year in college

_____ 8th grade

_____ Junior year in college

_____ Freshman year in HS

_____ Senior year in college

_____ Sophomore year in HS

_____ Graduate school

_____ Junior year in HS

_____ Law school

_____ High School graduate

_____ Other __________________

6. Is English your primary/native language?

_____ Yes

_____ No

If no, how long have you spoken English fluently? _______ Years
If English is not your native language, what is your native language? __________
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7. What is your current grade point average (GPA)? (choose one)

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

4.0 Scale Percent Grade Letter Grade
4.0
97-100
A+
3.9
93-96
A
3.7
90-92
A3.3
87-89
B+
3.0
83-86
B
2.7
80-82
B2.3
77-79
C+
2.0
73-76
C
1.7
70-72
C1.3
67-69
D+
1.0
65-66
D
0.0
Below 65
F

8. Have you ever taken or are you currently taking any of the following courses:
(check all that apply)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Introductory Social Psychology (SOP 3004)
Cognitive Processes (EXP 4604)
Memory & Memory Improvement (EXP 3523)
Legal Psychology (SOP 4842)
The Criminal Justice System (CCJ 3024)
Criminal Justice Administration (CCJ 3450)
Criminological Theory (CCJ 4014)
Ethics in Criminal Justice (CCJ 4054)
Seminar in Juvenile Delinquency (CCJ 5525)
Law Enforcement (CJE 3110)
Criminal Investigation (CJE 3610)
Juvenile Justice (CJJ 3010)
Correctional Law (CJL 4074)
I have never taken any of these courses
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Directions: The next few questions ask about your prior contact with police. It is
important that you answer these questions honestly.
1. Have you ever been arrested? (circle one)
0
1
2
Never

1 time

2-3 times

3
4-5 times

4
6 or more
times

If you answered 0, skip to question 2.
1a. If you have been arrested, when was the last time that you were arrested?
(check one)
□ less than 6 months ago
□ between 6-12 months ago
□ between 1 and 2 years ago
□ between 2-3 years ago
□ between 3-4 years ago
□ 5 or more years ago
1b. If you have been arrested, how many times have you been arrested? ________

2. Not counting any arrests, have you ever been questioned by the police about your
possible involvement in a delinquent or criminal offense? (circle one)
Yes

No

If you answered No, skip to question 3.
2a. If you have been questioned by police, when was the last time this occurred?
(check one)
□ less than 6 months ago
□ between 6-12 months ago
□ between 1 and 2 years ago
□ between 2-3 years ago
□ between 3-4 years ago
□ 5 or more years ago
2b. If you have been questioned by police, how many times has this
occurred? _________
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3. Have you ever been placed in juvenile detention or jail? (circle one)
0

1

2

3

Never

1 time

2-3 times

4-5 times

4
6 or more
times

If you answered 0, skip to question 4.
3a. If you have been placed in juvenile detention or jail, when was the last time
that you were placed in juvenile detention or jail? (check one)
□ less than 6 months ago
□ between 6-12 months ago
□ between 1 and 2 years ago
□ between 2-3 years ago
□ between 3-4 years ago
□ 5 or more years ago
3b. If you have been placed in juvenile detention or jail, how many times has this
occurred? ____________

4. Have you ever gone to court or been placed on probation? (circle one)
0

1

2

3

Never

1 time

2-3 times

4-5 times

4
6 or more
times

If you answered 0, you are done with this questionnaire.
4a. If you have gone to court or been placed on probation, when was the last time
that you went to court or were placed on probation? (check one)
□ less than 6 months ago
□ between 6-12 months ago
□ between 1 and 2 years ago
□ between 2-3 years ago
□ between 3-4 years ago
□ 5 or more years ago
4b. If you have gone to court or been placed on probation, how many times has
this occurred? ____________
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Appendix M
Manipulation Checks and Perceived Question and Police Aversiveness (Q 2)
1. Did you answer any additional questions about Floridians and Americans as a
result of some of your responses to the criminal and unethical behaviors survey?
(check one)
□Yes
(Continue to Question #2)
□ No (Skip to Question #7)
2. Did you answer the additional questions about Floridians and Americans when
you gave a ‘no’ response or a ‘yes’ response to the illegal behavior survey?
(check one)
□ when I gave a ‘no’ response
□ when I gave a ‘yes’ response
□ sometimes when I gave a ‘no’ response and sometimes when I gave a ‘yes’
response
3. The additional questions about Floridians and Americans were… (circle one for
each)
soothing

1

2

3

4

5

irritating

varied

1

2

3

4

5

repetitive

interesting

1

2

3

4

5

boring

pleasant

1

2

3

4

5

unpleasant

enjoyable

1

2

3

4

5

annoying

4. If you could have, how much would you have liked to have skipped the additional
questions about Floridians and Americans altogether? (circle one)
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little bit

Moderately

Quite a bit

A lot

5. Overall, how tempted were you to give a particular answer on the criminal and
unethical behaviors survey just to avoid having to answer the additional questions
about Floridians and Americans again? (circle one)
1
Not at all
tempted

2
A little
tempted

3
Moderately
tempted
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4
Quite
tempted

5
Very tempted

6. How glad were you when the additional questions about Floridians and
Americans were completely done? (circle one)
1
Not at all
glad

2
A little glad

3
Moderately
glad

4

5

Quite glad

Very glad

The experimenter is currently scoring your responses to the criminal and unethical
behaviors survey. Depending on your score, you may be signed up to meet with a
police officer in a few weeks to discuss your answers.
7. Did the experimenter tell you that you might have to meet with a police officer to
discuss your answers to the criminal and unethical behaviors survey? (check one)
□Yes □ No

8. Please indicate how you feel about having to possibly meet with a police officer
to discuss your answers. (circle one for each)
I am…
nervous

1

2

3

4

5

calm

reluctant

1

2

3

4

5

eager

unenthused

1

2

3

4

5

enthused

concerned

1

2

3

4

5

unconcerned

not looking
forward to

1

2

3

4

5

looking
forward to

9. How likely do you believe it is that the police officer will contact you for a
meeting? (circle one)
1
Not at all
likely

2
A little likely

3
Moderately
likely

4

5

Quite likely

Very likely

10. Please complete the following statement with a percentage (0-100%):
I am _________% certain that I will have to meet with the police officer.
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11. When do you think that you will meet with the police officer? (check one)
□ In one week
□ In 3 to 4 weeks
□ Not sure
12. How likely do you think it is that your score on the criminal and unethical
behaviors survey will require that you meet with a police officer to discuss your
answers?
1
Not at all
likely

2
A little likely

3
Moderately
likely

4

5

Quite likely

Very likely

13. How much do you hope that you won’t have to meet with a police officer to
discuss your answers to the criminal and unethical behaviors survey?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

A lot

14. What were you told about the criminal and unethical behaviors survey prior to
being interviewed? (check one)
□ I was told that I would be signed up to meet with a police officer to discuss
my answers if I said ‘YES’ to the questions on the criminal and unethical
behaviors survey
□ I was told that I would be signed up to meet with a police officer to discuss
my answers if I said ‘NO’ to the questions on the criminal and unethical
behaviors survey
□ I was NEVER told that I might have to meet with a police officer to discuss
my answers to the criminal and unethical behaviors survey
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Appendix N
Suspicion Check (Q 1)
1. Sometimes experiments study questions that are not obvious. Do you believe that
is the case in this experiment? □No □ Yes
If yes, please indicate what research questions you believe might be under
investigation in this experiment.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

2. Please indicate what you knew about this experiment before participating.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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Appendix O
Debriefing Statement
Legibly write down the participant’s responses to these questions.

1. Do you have any questions about the study?

2. What did you think about this experiment?

3. Did anything stand out as unusual?

4. Can you explain to me the purpose of the study?

5. Do you think you were misled in any way during the study? (If yes)…Can you
explain how?
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6. Before we started the criminal and unethical behaviors survey, when I first told you about the police officer,
how sure were you that you would have to have this meeting if your score required it?
1

2

3

Not at all
sure

4

5

6

Moderately
sure

7
Very sure

7. Before the criminal and unethical behaviors survey, when I first told you about the police officer, how likely did
you think it was that you could somehow get out of the meeting even if your score required it?
1
Not at all
likely

2

3

4
Moderately
likely
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5

6

7
Very likely

Those are all of the questions I had for you. Now I’d like to tell you more about the
study.
First, all of your responses are anonymous, will be combined with the responses of other
participants, and will be kept in a secured, locked office, and password protected
computer that can only be accessed by members of the research team.
All participants in the study completed a battery of surveys designed to assess their
demographic information, personality traits, illegal behaviors, and perceptions and
experiences. While completing the survey about criminal and unethical behaviors, some
participants were also asked additional follow-up questions every time they gave a ‘no’
response to the survey. Did you understand that you had to answer the additional followup questions every time you answered NO/YES to a question on the criminal and
unethical behaviors survey?
RECORD ANSWER HERE: ____________________________________
Participants were also told that, depending on how they answered the criminal and
unethical behaviors survey, they might be signed up to meet with a police officer in a few
weeks. Did you understand that you might have to meet with a police officer if you
answered YES/NO to most of the questions?
RECORD ANSWER HERE: ____________________________________

No participants were actually signed up to meet with a police officer. In fact, there are no
police officers involved with this study and there are no legal consequences for the
responses you provided today.
Additionally, all participants were told that it was very likely that they would have to
meet with the police officer based on their responses to the criminal and unethical
behaviors survey. Some of these participants were told that they could get out of this
meeting if they agreed to work in our lab for 30 hours over the course of the next month.
No participants who agreed to this deal will have to come into the lab to assist us with our
research. The purpose of offering the deal was to examine what situational and
dispositional factors would be most likely to induce participants to take a more certain
and less severe possible punishment for their interview responses in order to avoid the
possible meeting with the police officer.
The purpose of the additional questions and possible meeting with the police officer was
to examine how strongly immediate consequences, like the additional questions, versus
distal consequences, like meeting with a police officer, influence people’s willingness to
confess to criminal and unethical behaviors. We were specifically interested in whether
there were differences in this tendency based upon age group (adults vs. adolescents).
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Both real world and laboratory research studies have consistently shown that youth are at
an increased likelihood of providing false information, often in the form of false
confession, during police questioning. The primary purpose of this study is to attempt to
determine why that is the case by examining factors characteristic of youth development
(e.g., increased impulsivity, increased focus on present consequences, increased sensation
seeking, etc.) that possibly underlie youths’ increased interrogative vulnerability. The
questionnaires that we administered to you today were designed to measure some of
those characteristics.
Because you responded to the criminal and unethical behaviors survey in the context of
an experiment that included experimental manipulations and other controlled factors, the
research team cannot assume that your responses to the survey reflect your actual past
behaviors.
It is very important that you not share this information with others who might participate
in our study in the future. If a participant knew what the study was about before
participating, their data would be invalid and our study would be ruined. That is, if
people know the true purpose of the study before they participate, we will no longer be
able to conduct this research.
Do you promise not to share the true purpose of the study with other people?

RECORD ANSWER HERE: __________________________________________

If somebody asks you what the study is about, you can tell them it’s about criminal and
unethical behaviors.
Next, we would like to document your commitment to ensuring complete confidentiality
of the study procedures and purpose by having you sign this ‘Confidentiality Agreement’.
(HAND PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT. WHEN THE
PARTICIPANT HAS COMPLETED IT, TAKE THE FORM FROM THEM AND SAY…)
We sincerely appreciate your cooperation with ensuring the most accurate results of this
important study.
The findings of this research have the potential to provide important insights into the way
in which situational factors present during police questioning can influence a suspect’s
willingness to confess to a crime and how and why this varies by age. We did not tell
you this information before because knowing the true purpose of a study can lead
participants to consciously or unconsciously alter their responses. If that were to occur,
the integrity of the research findings would be compromised.
In closing, I’d like to thank you for volunteering to be in this study. Your participation
has been very valuable because it will further the field’s understanding of circumstances
that can influence how confessions are shaped by situational and dispositional factors. A
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blank consent form containing contact information is available for you at the exit if you
would like to take it.
Do you have any questions about the information I’ve just shared with you about the true
purpose of the study?

RECORD RESPONSE HERE (record a yes or no response and record the
participant’s questions if they have any): ________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
(REITERATE TO THE PARTICIPANT FOUR IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FROM THE
DEBRIEFING. (1) THERE ARE NO POLICE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE STUDY;
(2) THERE ARE NO LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OR ANY OTHER CONSEQUENCES
FOR THEM BASED ON THEIR RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY; (3) NO
INFORMATION THAT THEY PROVIDED US TODAY WILL BE SHARED WITH
ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THE RESEARCH TEAM IN A WAY THAT WILL ALLOW
OTHERS TO DIRECTLY LINK THAT INFORMATION BACK TO THEM; (4) NO ONE
WHO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT TO WORK IN OUR LAB IN ORDER TO GET OUT
OF THE POSSIBLE MEETING WITH THE POLICE OFFICER WILL ACTUALLY
HAVE TO COME WORK IN OUR LAB.)

Before you go, there is one last thing I need you to do. Now that you know the true
purpose of the study, it’s really important for us to get a TRUE assessment of how often
you’ve actually engaged in these behaviors. So what I’m going to have you do is
complete the criminal and unethical behaviors survey again. However, this time you will
complete the survey alone and there will be no consequences based on your responses.
That is, there will be no additional questions on the computer or possible meeting with a
police officer based on your responses – remember there are no police officers actually
involved in the study. Your responses will be anonymous, will not be able to be traced
back to you, and no one outside of the research team will have access to this information.
It is normal for participants in your situation to say they have/haven’t engaged in certain
criminal and unethical acts during the face-to-face interview when they in fact have
not/have, in order to avoid answering the additional questions. This time we ask that you
please answer all questions honestly even if that means giving different responses than
you provided earlier.
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Appendix P
Confidentiality Agreement

Confidentiality Agreement
I agree not to discuss or share any information about the details or purpose of this
experiment with anyone. I understand that by discussing this experiment with anyone
who may potentially participate, I will compromise the integrity of the experiment and
break this confidentiality agreement. The above stated has been explained to me and by
signing this form, I agree to keep all details of this experiment confidential.

______________________________________________
(Participant’s printed name)

___________
(Date)

______________________________________________
(Participant’s signature)

_______________________________________________
(Research Assistant’s printed name)

____________
(Date)

_______________________________________________
(Research Assistant’s signature)
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Appendix Q
CUB Interview Questions (Self-Administered)
Have you ever…
1. Drank (even just one sip), bought, or tried to buy alcohol
before you were 21?

□Yes □ No

2. Tried, used, or experimented with any illegal drugs such as
marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other kind of drug
even just one time?

□Yes □ No

3. Cheated on an exam, paper, homework assignment, or
school project by taking credit for someone else’s work,
ideas, or answers as your own (plagiarism) or helped
another person cheat?

□Yes □ No

4. Used something that belonged to somebody else without
permission, such as something that belonged to a family
member, friend, roommate, or acquaintance?

□Yes □ No

5. Made a harassing, threatening, or prank phone call, text
message, or social media post or private message?

□Yes □ No

6. Failed to wear a seat belt?

□Yes

□ No

7. Knowingly kept something of value that you received in
error, such as extra change given to you by a cashier or extra
merchandise from a store or from an internet purchase?

□Yes

□ No

8. Vandalized property, like keying a car, slashing a tire,
spraying graffiti, or egging a house or car?

□Yes

□ No

9. Invaded another’s privacy such as by reading another’s
diary, text messages, or emails without permission?

□Yes

□ No

10. Jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie
theater, or grocery store?

□Yes

□ No

11. Purposefully not returned something that you borrowed like
a book, clothing, or money?

□Yes

□ No

12. Engaged in a nonviolent sex offense such as exposing
yourself to someone by mooning or flashing them or
engaged in voyeurism, which is being a peeping Tom?

□Yes

□ No
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13. Started or spread a rumor about someone?

□Yes

□ No

14. Assaulted someone with the intent of harming him or her,
either with your bare hands or with any kind of object or
weapon? In other words, have you ever been in a physical
fight for the purposes of harming someone else?

□Yes

□ No

15. Smoked (even just one puff), bought, or tried to buy
cigarettes before you were 18?

□Yes

□ No

16. Trespassed or broken into a building for fun or to look

□Yes

□ No

17. Lied to your parents about where you were, who you were
with, or how much money you spent on something?

□Yes

□ No

18. Carried an illegal or concealed weapon, like a gun, knife, or

□Yes

□ No

19. Shoplifted something such as makeup products, clothing,
office supplies, food, or electronics?

□Yes

□ No

20. Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything

□Yes

□ No

around?

club?

else?
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Appendix R
Protocol for Terminating Study Sessions due to Participant Stress
If the participant becomes overly stressed during any portion of the study, it is important
that we terminate the study session immediately and fully debrief participants as to the
true purpose of the study. For our purposes we will define overly stressed as the
participant displaying 2 or more of the following behavioral indicators of stress (as cited
by The American Institute of Stress):
• Gritting, grinding teeth
• Tremors, trembling of lips, hands
• Muscle spasms
• Complaints of light headedness, faintness, dizziness
• Frequent blushing, sweating
• Comments about experiencing dry mouth or difficulty swallowing
• Developing visible rashes, itching, or hives
• Difficulty breathing, frequent sighing
• Comments about experiencing chest pain, palpitations, or rapid pulse
• Excess anxiety, worry, guilt, nervousness
• Increased anger, frustration, hostility
• Comments indicating that the individual is having difficulty concentrating or
experiencing racing thoughts
• Comments indicating the individual is feeling overloaded or overwhelmed
• Frequent or long-lasting crying spells
• Nervous habits, fidgeting, feet tapping
• Increased frustration, irritability, edginess
• Rapid or mumbled speech
• Excessive defensiveness
• Social withdrawal and isolation
• Vomiting or comments about experiencing heartburn, stomach pain, or nausea
If the participant is displaying only 1 of these indicators but you feel that it is excessive
and cause for concern, you should immediately express to the participant that you’ve
noticed they are upset or anxious about this process and you want to make sure that they
are not overly upset. Then ask the participant to indicate how stressed they are feeling
about this situation on a scale from 0 (not at all stressed) to 10 (overly stressed) about the
current situation. If the participant indicates being at an 8 or higher, you should
immediately terminate the study session and fully debrief the participant to the true
purpose of the study.
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